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Ellis: Loved and Lost: Breathing Life into the Rights of Noncustodial P

LOVED AND LOST: BREATHING LIFE INTO
THE RIGHTS OF NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS
Life is pleasant. Death is peaceful. It’s the transition that’s troublesome.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario:2 Clifford was a seven-year-old boy.
His parents, Charlie and Amy, divorced when he was five years old.
While Amy had full legal custody of Clifford, she and Charlie shared
physical custody. Clifford lived with Amy, but Charlie had visitation,
which he routinely utilized.
One day, while riding his bicycle, Clifford was hit by a car.
Although he was rushed to the hospital, Clifford sustained severe brain
damage, and he failed to regain consciousness. Unable to breathe or eat
on his own, Clifford was placed on life-support machines in order to
keep him alive.
A month after the accident, Clifford’s doctors
approached Amy to give her the medical news she had been dreading.
The doctors believed Clifford was not going to regain consciousness, and
they told Amy she needed to consider removing him from life-support.
Amy refused.
However, Charlie agreed with Clifford’s doctors,
believing that keeping Clifford on life-support would only prolong his
son’s pain and suffering. Charlie threatened that he would take
Clifford’s case to court to remove him from the life-support machines.
Fearing a long and expensive legal battle, Amy consented to disconnect
Clifford’s life-support.
Forced to take Clifford off life-support, Amy was furious with
Charlie for not supporting her decision. As Amy was planning Clifford’s
funeral, she maintained her anger towards Clifford’s father. She made
all of the burial decisions without allowing Charlie to participate. He
believed that his son should have been cremated, not buried. On the day
of the funeral, she refused to permit Charlie to enter the funeral home or
attend his child’s funeral.
The above scenario is entirely possible under the current legal
system. Statistics reveal that nearly half of all marriages end in divorce,
and forty percent of all children have divorced parents.3 The high
1
The Quotations Page, www.quotationspage.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2005) (quoting
Isaac Asimov).
2
The scenario is entirely hypothetical and not based on real persons.
3
Stephen J. Bahr, Social Science Research on Family Dissolution: What It Shows and How It
Might Be of Interest to Family Law Reformers, 4 J. L. FAM. STUD. 5, 5 (2002); see also William V.
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divorce rate and number of children who have divorced parents
increases the likelihood of the above scenario because at present, the
parent who has legal custody has total authority to make life-support
and burial decisions for his child.4 Giving the custodial parent the sole
right to make end-of-life decisions leaves the parent without legal
custody, despite being regularly involved in the child’s life, unable to
participate. Additionally, while state statutes generally define who has
the authority to make end-of-life decisions, the statutes fail to distinguish
between parents who are married and parents who are divorced.5 The
statutes’ failure to distinguish between married parents and divorced
parents has led to contradictory court decisions and confused parents.6
This Note proposes a model life-support and a model burial rights
statute to address the decision-making authority problem and to provide
a clear standard for courts and parents to follow in life-support and
burial disputes.7 Part II of this Note discusses the rights of parents in
different custody arrangements, how life-support and burial decisions
are generally made, and how the courts have dealt with disputes

Fabricius & Sanford L. Braver, Separated and Unmarried Fathers and the Courts: Non-Child
Support Expenditures on Children by Nonresidential Divorced Fathers: Results of a Study, 41
FAM. CT. REV. 321 (2003) (calling the increase in the divorce over the last half-century the
“divorce revolution”); Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging
Divorced Fathers To Parent, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 924 (2005) (stating that each year
approximately one million children have parents who divorce or separate).
4
See infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. End-of-life disputes may be even more
likely for the children of divorced parents because they are more likely to have “poorer
physical health.” Heather Crosby, The Irretrievable Breakdown of the Child: Minnesota’s Move
Toward Parenting Plans, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 489, 505 (2000) (quoting Diane N.
Lye, Ph.D., What the Experts Say: Scholarly Research on Post-Divorce Parenting and Child WellBeing, in REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE GENDER AND JUSTICE COMMISSION AND
DOMESTICS RELATIONS COMMISSION 10 (June 1999)).
5
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11 (2004) (listing “one of the patient’s parents” as a
potential surrogate decision-maker for incompetent patients); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18
(West 2001) (listing the decedent’s surviving parents as a class of interment decisionmakers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.631 (Michie 2004) (listing the parents of the child as
surrogate decision-makers); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.035 (Vernon 2001)
(listing the patient’s parents as the persons who may make a health care directive for those
under the age of eighteen); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002 (Vernon 2005)
(declaring that either parent may make the interment decisions). But see MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 194.119(2)(3)(a)–(c) (West 2004) (distinguishing between married and divorced parents
in allocating interment decision-making authority).
6
Compare Tully v. Pate, 372 F. Supp. 1064 (D.S.C. 1973) (applying custody case law to
determine which parent had burial decision-making authority), with In re Admin. of K.A.,
807 N.E.2d 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (using the state’s interment statute to allocate decisionmaking power between divorced parents).
7
See infra Part IV.
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between parents over burial and life-support decision-making power.8
Next, Part III of this Note analyzes how traditional custodial decisionmaking power is allocated and how the distribution methods are
inapplicable and unwise once the child is deceased or unable to sustain
life other than by artificial means.9 Finally, Part IV proposes two model
statutes to change and clarify the allocation of end-of-life decisionmaking power for the children of divorced parents.10 The goals of the
proposed statutes are to give both parents equal rights when making
end-of-life decisions if both want to be involved and to provide methods
for avoiding or resolving any disputes that may arise when the parents
cannot agree during the decision-making process.11
II. BACKGROUND
Parents have the right to participate in the decision-making process
due to the parent-child relationship.12 Part.II.A begins with a discussion
of the rights inherent in the parent-child relationship and how courts
divide these rights when the parents divorce.13 Next, Part.II.B reviews
the rights of loved ones in making decisions concerning life-support and
the disputes that can arise when parents of divorced children have to
make life-sustaining treatment decisions.14 Finally, Part.II.C examines
the burial decision-making process and how disputes can occur between
family members, specifically between divorced parents, over the right to
bury their child.15
A. Parental Rights and Child Custody
Parents have the special right to make decisions regarding their
children, and a court divides these rights between parents when it enters
a custody order.16 The court determines custody and allocates decisionmaking power between parents by applying the best interests test when
creating the custody order.17 Despite the specificity of the custody

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3.
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orders, disputes still arise between parents over certain decision-making
rights.18
1.

Parental Decision-Making Rights

Parents possess both inherent and legally created rights regarding
their children because of the parent-child relationship.19 Included in the
rights that arise from the parent-child relationship is the right of parents
to make decisions regarding their children.20 Parents have the right to

See infra Part II.A.4.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-606 (West 2004) (stating that the parents are the
natural joint guardians and both the mother and father have equal power over their
children); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-1 (2004) (stating that the father and mother have natural
joint custody over their children); OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.08 (2003) (“The wife and
husband are the joint natural guardians of their minor children and are equally charged
with their care, nurture, welfare, and education and the care and management of their
estates.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15.1-1 (1995) (stating that the husband and wife are joint
guardians of their minor children and are charged equally with their care, nurture, welfare,
and education); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-102(a) (2005) (stating that parents have a natural
and legal duty to provide an education for their children); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (stating that parents have the right to “companionship, care, custody,
and management” of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (stating
that parents have a natural and legal duty to provide an education for their children); 59
AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 22 (2002) (stating that common law, statutory law, and
natural law require parents to care for their children); LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C.
NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 504 (William S. Hein & Co. 2002)
(stating that parents are their children’s natural and legal guardians); Katherine ConnellThouez, Comparative Developments in Alimentary Obligations and Parental Authority: Linking
Traditional Rights and Responsibilities To Create an Integrated Structure for Solving the Child
Care Dilemma, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1986) (“Parental authority involves the exercise of
rights and obligations by parents in the care, both moral and material, of their children.”);
Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 807
(1985) (stating that the parent-child relationship gives parents the “right to supervise, care
for, and educate their child, the child has a right to receive support and maintenance from
his parents, and both have rights to inherit from one another and to recover for injury
tortiously inflicted on the other”). Included in the duties of the parent-child relationship is
the requirement to pay for the child’s funeral expenses. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 72
(2002). Generally, if the parents have joint custody, the funeral costs are split between the
parents. Id.
20
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (declaring that the interest parents have to control and care for their
children is possibly the “oldest of the fundamental liberty interests”); 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent
and Child § 26 (2002) (stating that custody includes the right to make decisions for the
child); WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 579 (stating that the parental right to make
decisions is part of the fundamental right to privacy); see also, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 151.001 (Vernon 2004) (stating that the parent of a child has the right to make medical,
legal, religious, and educational decisions for the child). The Supreme Court of the United
States has stated that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the parents’ right to determine
their child’s upbringing. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719. The Court stated that:
18
19
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make decisions for their children because the law views children as
incompetent and thus unable to make decisions for themselves.21
Parents retain the right to make decisions so long as their decisions do
not cause physical or emotional harm to their children.22 While they are
married, parents share decision-making power over their child.23

The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
“liberty” it protects includes more than the absence of physical
restraint. . . . The Clause also provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests. . . . [W]e have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the “liberty” specially protected by the
Due Process Clause includes the rights to . . . direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children.
Id. at 719–20. There are three potential situations in which the parents’ right to make
decisions for their children may be superseded. WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 504.
First, public policy favors allowing someone else, or a surrogate, to make a decision for the
child when obtaining a parent’s consent would harm the best interests of the child. Id.
Second, if the child becomes legally emancipated, the child can make decisions for him or
herself without the need for the parent’s support. Id. Third, parental consent is not needed
in emergency situations when waiting for the parent would cause the child “immediate
and irreparable harm.” Id. If it is not an emergency, a physician who treats a minor
without parental consent is guilty of battery against the child. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS &
SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 762 (West
2003).
21
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (stating that children need parents to make
certain decisions for them, such as medical treatment decisions, because children are not
yet mature enough to make informed decisions for themselves); WARDLE & NOLAN, supra
note 19, at 503 (stating that parents have the right to make the decisions for their children
because children are considered immature and incapable of making informed decisions
until they reach the age of maturity); Jennifer L. Rosato, The End of Adolescence: Let’s Get
Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment in Health Care DecisionMaking, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 771 (2002) (stating that children do not have the right to
make their own decisions because they lack the “capacity and experience” to make
informed decisions). Before they reach the age of majority, children are considered to be
“incompetent.” WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 503. In addition, at a more basic level,
parents are the natural decision-makers for their children because they wish to keep them
safe and teach them how to take care of themselves, which preserves the human species.
See Connell-Thouez, supra note 19, at 1138.
22
24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 930 (1998) (“The essence of custody is the
companionship of the child and the right to make decisions regarding his care, control,
education, . . . health care, and religious training, without involvement by the court, unless
there is danger to the child’s physical health or emotional development.”).
23
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-606 (West 2004) (stating that the parents,
regardless of gender, have equal power over their children); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2111.08 (2003) (“The wife and husband have equal powers, rights, and duties and neither
parent has any right paramount to the right of the other concerning the parental rights and
responsibilities for the care of the minor.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-100 (Law. Co-op. 1985)
(stating that parents have a joint natural custody with equal rights and power).
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However, when parents divorce, a court is responsible for dividing the
power to make major life decisions for the child.24
2.

Custody Arrangements and Decision-Making Rights

A court divides the parents’ decision-making power by creating a
new custody arrangement.25 Through a custody decree, the court
allocates physical and legal custody between the parents.26 If a parent
has physical custody, that parent has the ability to make the day-to-day
decisions concerning the child as well as the duty to care for the child
while the child is in his physical custody.27 In addition, a court can
divide legal custody between the parents.28 If a parent has legal custody,
he has the complete right to make all major life decisions for the child.29
Usually, the parent without legal custody does not have any power to
24
Wexler, supra note 19, at 807 (stating that when parents divorce, it breaks up the
family unit, and any rights or obligations that are a part of the parent-child relationship are
divided between the parents); see also 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 20 (stating that the
parents have equal custody until the court divides the custody through a decree).
25
Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 60–61 (1984); see also James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s
Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
845, 855 (2003) (stating that after a marriage dissolves, the court must determine whether a
parent will continue to have the same rights and duties as he had when he was married or
if he will only retain the right of visitation); Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional
Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 27, 30 (1985) (stating that although parents have equal
decision-making power before they divorce, once the marriage dissolves the court
reallocates decision-making power between the parents).
26
See, e.g., Shenk v. Shenk, 860 A.2d 408, 412 (Md. App. 2004) (ordering joint legal
custody to both parents and primary physical custody to the mother); see Danece Day
Koenigs, Comment, Child Custody Arrangements: Say What You Mean, Mean What You Say,
31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 591, 595 (1996) (stating that custody orders must include
provisions addressing physical and legal custody).
27
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.003 (2004) (defining the physical custodian as the parent
who provides “routine daily care” and “control”); WIS. STAT. § 767.001(5) (1983) (defining
physical placement as “the right to have a child physically placed” with the parent, and
stating that the parent “has the right and responsibility to make, during that placement,
routine daily decisions regarding the child’s care, consistent with major decisions made by
a person having legal custody”); In re Wesley J.K., 445 A.2d 1243, 1247 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (“Examples of these minor matters are what and when to eat, when to do chores, and
when to go to bed.”).
28
WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 865; 2-10 Child Custody and Visitation § 10.03
(2004), available at LEXIS File CCVLWP; see also, e.g., Shea v. Metcalf, 712 A.2d 887 (Vt.
1998). In Shea, the family court divided legal custody between the parents, but it gave only
the father the right to make medical and educational decisions for the children. Id. at 888.
29
WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 865; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.003 (stating that
the parent who has legal custody is entitled to determine the child’s upbringing, including
education, health care, and religious training); WIS. STAT § 767.001 (defining legal custody
as the “right and responsibility” to make all of the child’s major life decisions except for
those otherwise allocated by the custody decree).
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make major decisions.30 However, the noncustodial parent does retain
some rights, such as the right to access the child’s medical records and
the right to make day-to-day decisions for the child while the child is in
his physical custody.31
The different types of custody—sole custody and joint custody—
allocate physical and legal custody between the parents differently.32
Generally, in a sole custody arrangement, one parent has full legal
custody of the child, essentially retaining the same decision-making
power he had while the parents were married.33 The parent with sole
custody may also retain physical custody, the parent with sole custody
may share custody with the noncustodial parent, or the noncustodial
parent may have physical custody of the child.34

30
Divorce and Separation, supra note 22, § 930 (stating that the essence of custody is the
right to make decisions regarding the child and that the court should not become involved
unless the decision hurts the child physically or emotionally); see also, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-17-2-17 (1999) (declaring that the custodial parent determines the child’s upbringing,
including the child’s education and medical care, unless it would hurt the child physically
or emotionally); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.405 (West 2003) (stating that the parent who
maintains legal custody has the right to make decisions unless those decisions would hurt
the child).
31
2-10 Child Custody and Visitation, supra note 28, § 10.03. The noncustodial parent is
permitted to make the day-to-day decisions for the child in order to avoid interference with
his right to visitation. Id.; see also, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-100 (Law. Co-op. 1985)
(stating that both the custodial and noncustodial parents have the right to access school
records, medical records, and to participate in school activities); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6110(a) (2001) (asserting that the noncustodial parent has the right to have phone
conversations at least twice per week; send mail; receive notice of relevant information as
soon as practicable but within twenty-four hours of any event of hospitalization, major
illness, or death of the child; and to receive the child’s medical and school records); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (Michie 2003) (declaring that a noncustodial parent has the right to
access medical and school records and to attend teacher’s conferences).
32
See Jovana Vujovic, Family Law Chapter: Child Custody and Visitation, 5 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 477, 488 (2004) (“Courts may award joint or sole custody.”).
33
WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 865; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-151(4) (2004)
(stating that the parent that has sole legal custody has complete “rights and responsibilities
to make major decisions concerning the child, including, but not limited to, the education
of the child, health care, and religious training”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-6 (2004) (stating
that the parent “awarded sole custody of a child shall have the rights and responsibilities
for major decisions concerning the child, including the child’s education, health care, and
religious training”); WIS. STAT. § 767.001(5) (1983) (defining sole legal custody as the “the
condition under which one party has legal custody”).
34
WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 865; see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3007 (West 2004)
(stating that the child resides with and is “under the supervision” of the parent who has
sole custody).
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However, in a joint custody arrangement, the parents may
simultaneously share the physical and legal custody of the child.35 In
this type of arrangement, both parents have equal decision-making
power regarding the child.36 Because joint custody allocates the power
to make decisions concerning the child equally between the parents,
courts regularly require that the parents are able to cooperate and
communicate with each other effectively.37 The parents need not always
agree, but they must be able to make decisions for their children together
when necessary.38 Even if the court finds that both parents are dedicated
WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 865. Jurisdictions vary over whether they award
joint custody. Divorce and Separation, supra note 22, § 940. In addition, joint custody may
be awarded as joint legal custody only or joint physical custody only. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 30-3-151 (2004) (defining joint custody as including joint legal and joint physical custody,
joint legal custody as allowing both parents equal decision-making power over their
children, and joint physical custody as shared physical custody between the parents in
order to promote “frequent and substantial contact with each parent”); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-9-2-67 (1999) (stating that parents who have joint legal custody have equal decisionmaking authority, including decisions concerning education, medical care, and religion);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (Michie 2004) (defining joint custody as joint legal custody, joint
physical custody, or any combination of joint legal and joint physical custody); see also In re
Wesley J.K., 445 A.2d 1243, 1247 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). In Wesley, the court stated that:
There are two basic versions of joint custody: joint “legal” custody and
joint “physical” custody. The former consists exclusively of the shared
decision making function. The latter has the additional component of
shared residence. That is, under joint physical custody the children
live with each parent on an equal or split-time basis. Thus, in a sense,
minor as well as major decisions are made by both parents where there
is joint physical custody.
Id.
36
Vujovic, supra note 32, at 488 (stating if the parents have joint physical custody, the
child “spends a significant amount of time with each parent”).
37
WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 865; see also Leary v. Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 34 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (stating that it was most important that the parents could
communicate well with each other and then asked the mother whether she and the father
could make decisions together concerning the child’s religious upbringing and education);
Waller v. Waller, 754 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Miss. 2000) (stating that the most important factor
in determining whether to award joint custody is the parents’ ability to communicate with
each other); Anderson v. Anderson, 791 P.2d 116, 117 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that
courts should only award joint custody if parents are likely to cooperate, if they are able to
provide a healthy home, and if it will not disrupt the child’s life).
38
2-13 Child Custody and Visitation, supra note 28, § 13.06; see also Barton v. Hirshberg, 767
A.2d 874, 881 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001); Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 529 N.W.2d 724, 726
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that although the parents often did not get along, they were
able to put aside their differences when needed). In Barton, the parents practiced two
different religions: the father was Jewish and the mother was Christian. 767 A.2d at 878.
The father filed for sole legal and physical custody because the mother had not raised the
son according to the Jewish faith, failed to consult with him on issues of health, and did not
follow the visitation schedule. Id. at 878–79. The mother then filed suit stating that she
wanted sole custody of their son. Id. at 879. Even though the mother accused the father of
35
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to their children and are model parents, they still must have a basic
ability to communicate in order for the court to award joint custody.39
Increasingly, courts have found that ordering joint custody is in the
child’s best interests as well as the parents’ best interests.40 Joint custody
arrangements have been found to give parents a greater sense of
connection with their child and can also help boost the parents’ feelings
of self-worth and dignity.41 However, some courts do not believe that

abuse and the father fought for sole custody, the court found that they should still have
joint custody because, in general, they could communicate. Id. at 881.
39
See Leary, 627 A.2d at 34 (holding that the mother should have sole custody although
the father was a loving parent); see also In re Wesley J.K., 445 A.2d 1243, 1249 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (stating that the parents do not need to have an “amicable relationship,” but must be
able to put aside their personal conflicts in order to make decisions for their children). In
Leary, the court refused to award joint custody. 627 A.2d at 34. Originally, the trial court
awarded sole custody to the mother, but later she wanted the court to award joint custody
between herself and the father. Id. at 32. The trial court held that the mother should have
sole custody, even though it said that both parents were “dedicated and devoted” and
“sincerely love[d] their children.” Id. at 35. The court gave the mother sole custody
because the mother was “more mature” than the father, “more sincere, more realistic in her
approach to life and [was] better equipped to plan for the future best interests of the minor
children.” Id. The court also acknowledged that there were many examples of the parents’
inability to communicate with each other. Id.
40
See 2-12 Child Custody and Visitation, supra note 28, § 12.06 (stating that joint custody
benefits the parents and the children). Many states statutorily presume that joint custody is
in the best interest of the child. Vujovic, supra note 32, at 488. Also, more parents are
trying to obtain joint custody. Katherine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the
Context of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 5, 8
(2002). But see Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L.
REV. 497, 502 (1998) (arguing that joint custody may not be the best situation for children or
parents, especially if the court forces the parents into a joint custody agreement). Singer
and Reynolds instead believe that a custody arrangement where one parent has full
decision-making power and the other parent has a large amount of visitation rights could
achieve the same goals as a joint custody arrangement. Id.
41
2-12 Child Custody and Visitation, supra note 28, § 12.06; see also Burchell v. Burchell, 684
S.W.2d 296, 300 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that joint custody benefits the parents, the
children, and society in general, and that “the continued involvement of both parents in the
vital decisions to be made have been extolled in the popular media as well as legal
treatises”); Wesley, 445 A.2d at 1247 (stating that the child is less likely to be used as a
weapon against the parent in a joint custody arrangement because “in sole custody, the
custodial parent can frustrate the visiting rights of the non-custodial parent, and short of
going back to court, the visitor has no way of enforcing his or her rights”). In Wesley, the
court stated that the parent with sole custody has a better opportunity to portray the
noncustodial parent in a negative light. 445 A.2d at 1247. However, in a joint custody
arrangement, “neither parent has a superior legal advantage and is therefore less likely to
take unfair advantage of the other.” Id. The court reasoned that both parents have a
recognized right to make decisions concerning their children, and therefore “neither parent
can obtain concessions by threatening to prevent the other from seeing the child; nor can
one make a major decision without consulting the other.” Id. The court also explained that
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ordering a joint custody arrangement is appropriate.42 For example, one
court has stated that it is not in the best interests of the child to “shunt”
them back and forth between homes.43 However, whether the parents
receive joint or physical custody depends upon the factors the court uses
to determine custody.44
3.

Approaches to Determining Custody

The approach courts use to determine whether to award parents
joint or sole custody is the best interests standard.45 Under this standard,

in not allowing the non-custodial parent to have any decision-making power, it assigns
them a “second-class status.” Id.
42
Bartlett, supra note 40, at 21. Bartlett states that joint custody is really not as popular
as it seems. Id. at 21–22. She uses Oregon as an example, which requires parents to agree
to the terms of a custody order before a court may award the custody order and indicates
that other states discourage joint custody. Id. at 24–25.
43
Brauer v. Brauer, 384 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Brauer, the court
stated that, “[r]egularity in the daily routine of providing the child with food, sleep, and
general care, as well as stability in the human factors affecting the child’s emotional life and
development, is essential, and it is difficult to attain this regularity and stability where a
young child is shunted back and forth between two homes.” Id. In this case, the court did
not award joint custody. Id. at 599.
44
See infra Part II.A.3.
45
See Vujovic, supra note 32, at 486 (stating that all fifty states require courts to apply the
best interests standard when making a custody or visitation decision); see also, e.g., CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2004) (declaring that child custody shall be awarded in accordance
with the best interests of the child); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (West 2004) (stating that the
court shall determine custody based on the best interests of the child). At English common
law, only the father had the right to custody of the child. Andrew Schepard, Taking
Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 695
(1985). The child was the property of the father, and he had complete control over the
child’s life and death. Crosby, supra note 4, at 492. In addition, courts viewed fathers as
more able than mothers to provide financially for their children. Vujovic, supra note 32, at
480. Then, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, the
industrial revolution changed the courts’ views about awarding custody only to the father.
Id. In the new industrial-based economy, men began to work outside the home to earn
wages, leaving mothers responsible for raising the children and managing the home.
Schepard, supra at 696. At the same time, courts began to view children as more than
property, and courts became concerned instead with the children’s best interests. Crosby,
supra note 4, at 492–93. Because mothers had more contact with their children than the
fathers, courts deemed that favoring mothers when awarding custody was in the best
interests of the child. Vujovic, supra note 32, at 480. Known as the tender years doctrine,
the courts presumed mothers to be more capable of nurturing young children and gave
mothers complete legal and physical custody and fathers limited visitation. Schepard,
supra at 696–97. In the 1960s, ninety percent of custody cases gave the mother custody of
the children. Koenigs, supra note 26, at 595. Because the courts had an automatic
presumption in favor of awarding custody to mothers, they failed to truly evaluate what
custody arrangement was in the best interests of the child. Crosby, supra note 4, at 495.
Beginning in the 1970s, more women began to enter the workforce, and courts moved away
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a court is most concerned with establishing a custody order that furthers
what is in the best interests of the child.46 Generally, courts have found
that stability and continuity are in the child’s best interests.47 Therefore,
from the presumption that awarding custody to the mother was in the child’s best interest,
instead applying a more neutral best interests test. Vujovic, supra note 32, at 480.
46
59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 30 (2002) (stating that in determining the best
interests of the child, the court considers “only those facts that directly affect the child’s
well-being, and must avoid assigning too much weight to any one particular factor in
determining child custody”); WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 19, at 863.
47
See, In re Alexander C., 760 A.2d 532, 534 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that continuity
and stability of the child’s environment are important in determining the best interests of
the child); In re Paternity of M.J.M., 766 N.E.2d 1203, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that
when a court makes a custody determination, continuity and stability are important
factors); Ketchum v. Ketchum, 882 So. 2d 631, 637 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Bower v. Bower, 758
So. 2d 405, 410 (Miss. 2000) (stating that the best interests of the child include determining
which parent was the primary custodian of the child before the parents separated as well as
stability of the home environment); Jasper v. Jasper, 351 N.W.2d 114, 117 (S.D. 1984).
Stability and continuity are just two common factors among many that state statutes
include in the best interests analysis. See Vujovic, supra note 32, at 481–85. Some common
factors used in the best interest analysis include:
(1) the child’s physical, emotional, mental, and religious and social
needs; (2) each parent’s ability and desire to meet those needs; (3) the
child’s preference, provided that the child is of sufficient age to
articulate and comprehend such a preference; (4) the parents’
preferences; (5) the child’s interaction with her parents and siblings; (6)
whether one parent was the primary caretaker; (7) the bond between
the child and each parent; (8) the suitability of the existing custody and
visitation arrangement, including whether it has provided a stable
environment to which the child is well-adjusted; (9) the parent’s ability
and willingness to encourage the child’s relationship with the other
parent and cooperate in decisions regarding the child’s welfare; (10)
any history of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect; (11)
substance abuse by a parent or member of household; (12) each
parent’s criminal record; (13) the mental and physical health of all
involved; (14) parent’s bad-faith, coercion or duress in negotiating the
custody agreement; (15) the child’s age and sex; (16) each parent’s
moral fitness and (17) the child’s cultural background.
Id. For example, Indiana’s custody statute declares that the following factors must be
considered to determine the best interests of the child:
(1) The age and sex of the child. (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or
parents. (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to
the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age. (4)
The interaction and interrelationship of the child with: (A) the child’s
parent or parents; (B) the child’s sibling; and (C) any other person who
may significantly affect the child’s best interests. (5) The child’s
adjustment to the child’s: (A) home; (B) school; and (C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; (7)
Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian,
and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors
described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
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when making a custody determination, courts examine the relationship
each parent had with the child during the parents’ marriage.48
Despite its wide-spread use, critics argue against the best interests
approach because they claim it is only a “policy goal and not an
administrable legal standard.”49 Therefore, reforms in allocating custody
have been designed to guide parents toward better decision-making for
their children.50 For example, courts increasingly allow, and some
require, parents to define their own custody arrangement for their
children.51 In creating their own custody order, parents are forced to
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8; see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 2004) (listing the
factors that the court must take into consideration as the “health, safety and welfare of the
child”; whether there were any allegations of abuse; whether one parent had primary care
taking responsibility; “the nature and amount of contact with both parents”; and whether
either parent used alcohol or drugs); MINN. STAT. § 257.025 (Supp. 2004) (listing the wishes
of the parties; the child’s preference; the primary caretaker relationship; the child-parent
relationship with each parent; the “child’s adjustment to home, school, and community”;
the length of time the child has spent in their current surroundings; the mental and
physical health of the parents and the child; the ability of the parents to love and care for
the child; and the child’s cultural background as best interests factors).
48
2-10 Child Custody and Visitation, supra note 28, § 10.09. Although the parents’ past
involvement with the child is not the only consideration, it is used in several best interests
custody statutes. Bartlett, supra note 40, at 16. However, in West Virginia, the parents’
prior relationship with the child is the sole determining factor when a court awards
custody. Id. Known as the primary caretaker approach, it reasons that all else being equal,
custody should go to the person who has taken responsibility for the child by doing things
like cooking, cleaning, and making the medical care decisions. 2-10 Child Custody and
Visitation, supra note 28, § 10.09.
49
Bartlett, supra note 40, at 15–16. In addition, the belief that parents can be trusted to
make wise decisions for their children is gaining more credence. Andrew Kaplan, The
Advantages of Mediation in Resolving Child Custody Disputes, 23 RUTGERS L. REC. 5 (1999),
available at http://www.lawrecord.com (follow “Archives” to volume 23).
50
Bartlett, supra note 40, at 5. (“Parents are increasingly able to determine their own
arrangements after divorce, with the state’s role directed toward facilitating parentaldecisionmaking rather than bringing about its own preferred outcomes.”). In this article,
the author points to several different methods that have grown in popularity recently. See
generally Bartlett, supra note 40. The purpose of parenting plans is “to focus parents’
attention on their children when financial or emotional issues might otherwise direct their
attention elsewhere.” Id. Courts are also requiring mandatory parenting education classes.
Id. In addition, parents are seeking more involvement in their children’s lives. Id. at 8.
51
Id. at 6; see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-153 (2004) (stating that parents must submit a
parenting plan if they are seeking joint custody); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (Supp.
2004) (requiring a parenting plan before awarding joint custody to the parents); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124 (West 2005) (stating that parents may provide the court with a
parenting plan, allocating decision-making rights); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31
(Supp. 2004) (stating that if there is a custody dispute or the parents want joint custody,
they must submit a parenting plan); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (Supp. 2004) (stating that the
court shall consider the parenting plan submitted by the parents when making its custody
decision); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234 (2003) (stating that in all custody proceedings
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provide greater specificity in allocating exact decision-making power.52
Through the creation of a parenting plan, parents specifically allocate
their decision-making rights and designate a method for resolving future
disputes.53
4.

Parental Disputes Over Decision-Making Rights

Although the court allocates different powers between the parents
when it issues a custody decree, disputes may still arise between the
parents over the right to make certain decisions.54 If brought to court,
custody disputes tend to be expensive, time-consuming, contentious,
and damaging to the long-term needs of the family.55 Alternatively,
there is a growing trend towards the use of mediation in custody and
visitation disputes because it is considered to be in the best interests of
the child.56 Proponents claim that mediation helps resolve divorce
parents must submit a parenting plan); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181 (West 2005)
(stating that parents must submit a parenting plan to the court).
52
See Bartlett, supra note 40, at 5.
53
Crosby, supra note 4, at 510. A parenting plan is “[a] plan that allocates custodial
responsibility and decision-making authority for what serves the child’s best interests and
that provides a mechanism for resolving any later disputes between parents.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (8th ed. 2004).
54
Priscilla Day, When Parents Can’t Agree: Representing the Parent Who Shares Legal
Custody, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 532, 532 (2000). Although the court may have
specifically delineated decision-making authority over certain areas, such as education and
health, there may be changes that create unforeseen disagreement. Id. For example,
parents may form new attitudes toward religion or the type of education their children
should receive. Id.
55
2-10 Child Custody and Visitation, supra note 28, § 10.07; see also, e.g., Kloberdanz v.
Kloberdanz, No. 4-596/04-1100, 2004 Iowa App. LEXIS 882, at *7 (2004) (stating that the
parties’ custody modification case was “contentious” and “expensive”); see also Kaplan,
supra note 49, at 4 (stating that, when it comes to custody disputes, the adversarial method
is “antiquated,” “ineffective,” and inherently has the potential for conflict); Jessica Pearson,
Court Services: Meeting the Needs of Twenty-First Century Families, 33 FAM. L.Q. 617, 628
(1999) (stating that custody and other family law disputes are “often time-consuming,
expensive, and cumbersome, with some aspects of the dispute being adjudicated more than
once”).
56
Kaplan, supra note 49, at 5 (stating that although mediation may not always solve all
issues that arise during the divorce process, “referral to mediation for child custody will
make a significant contribution to the restoration of equilibrium in the family and serve the
best interests of children”); see also Gary D. Williams, Note, Weighing the Costs and Benefits of
Mediating Estate Planning Issues Before Disputes Between Family Members Arise: The Scale Tips
in Favor of Mediation, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 819, 819–20 (2001) (declaring that
mediation is widely used to resolve family disputes). One-quarter of states require parents
to use mediation to resolve custody and visitation disputes. Bartlett, supra note 40, at 11.
Most states do not allow mediation when there has been domestic violence and some do
not allow it when there have been allegations of alcoholism or when previous mediation
attempts have been unsuccessful. Id. at 13.
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disputes because it encourages parents to create their own solutions to
conflicts.57
Additionally, mediation allows couples “to address
emotional issues; to understand, or at least listen to, each other’s
concerns; to build a means for resolving future disputes; and to reach an
agreement that meets their unique needs.”58 Also, mediation permits
parents to address their concerns without having to alter the original
custody arrangement.59 Similar to parenting plans, mediation allows
parents more input into the decisions concerning their child.60
However, when disputes do come before a court, the court usually
does not make the decision. Instead, it chooses which parent should
have the decision-making authority.61 The court may temporarily or
permanently change the custody order to evidence the change in the
decision-making power.62 For example, a change in the child’s medical
condition is one issue that may require modification of the custodial
allocation of power or enforcement of the original custody order.63
In Gorman v. Zeigler,64 the court modified the original custody decree,
thereby modifying the medical decision-making power of the parents.65
57
Williams, supra note 56, at 838. See generally Roger C. Clapp, Family Law Disputes Cry
Out for Mediated Settlements, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 34 (1998).
58
Williams, supra note 56, at 838. Mediation is also highly recommended when the
parents have joint custody. Gregory S. Forman, Joint Legal Custody: What Is It? Why Have
it?, 12 S. CAROLINA LAWYER 18, 20 (2000).
59
See Forman, supra note 58, at 20 (“The key to a well-drafted mediation provision is to
allow the parties a meaningful opportunity to resolve their disputes without the necessity
of seeking a modification of the joint legal custody arrangement.”).
60
Kaplan, supra note 49, at 827.
61
2-10 Child Custody and Visitation, supra note 28, § 10.07.
62
Id. § 10.01; see, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-204 (Michie 2005) (stating that parents can
petition to modify custody but must show a material change in circumstances).
63
See Barnes v. Barnes, 549 N.E.2d 61, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the mother,
who was the custodial parent, must consult with the father before making medical
expenses); Senatore v. Senatore, 58 Pa. D. & C. 4th 564, 564 (Pike Ct. C.P. 2000). The parents
in Senatore originally shared legal custody of their son. Id. The father disagreed with the
mother’s decision to give their ten-year-old son antidepressant medication. Id. at 565. The
court held that under the joint custody agreement, the father should have been consulted
before giving the medication to his son and that medical treatment should terminate until
the parents could come to an agreement as to his treatment. Id. at 569. Medical decisionmaking is just one example of the many issues that can arise when the decision-making
power inherent to the parent-child relationship is divided between the parents through a
custody decree. See, e.g., Andros v. Andros, 396 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(terminating a joint legal custody arrangement and awarding sole legal and physical
custody to one parent because the parents disagreed over their child’s religion). In Andros,
the court held that the parents’ inability to cooperate had created an emotional health
problem for their children. Id. at 922.
64
690 N.E.2d 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
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After their daughter developed a serious medical condition, both parents
were actively involved in making medical decisions for her.66 However,
after some time, the mother filed an emergency petition for custody
because she wanted to take her daughter out of the state for a special
treatment program.67 The court granted the mother temporary custody
of the daughter for the duration of the daughter’s medical treatment.68 It
reasoned that the parents, who normally had the authority to make these
decisions together, were unable to make a joint decision quickly enough
in this situation.69 The daughter’s serious illness and the parents’
dispute over treatment changed her needs dramatically, affected her best
interests, and changed the underlying basis for the custody decree.70
As shown in Gorman, although a court fully allocates the decisionmaking authority when it orders joint or sole legal custody, disputes
may still arise between parents.71 Another decision that may cause a
dispute between parents is the decision to take their child off lifesupport.72

65
Id. at 734. When the parents originally separated, the court granted the mother
temporary custody of their children, and the father was granted visitation rights. Id. at 731.
However, the mother took the children with her when she moved from Indiana to
California. Id. The father then petitioned the court to have the children returned. Id. After
the court ordered that the children be returned to Indiana, the parents agreed to a joint
legal custody arrangement. Id. The father was granted primary physical custody, and the
mother received visitation rights. Id.
66
Id. at 731. Doctors discovered that the daughter had a brain tumor shortly after she
went to live with her father. Id. She had to have brain surgery to have the tumor removed,
and both parents met with their child’s doctor to discuss her treatment options. Id. At the
meeting, they came to a joint decision to allow their child to receive a certain type of
chemotherapy treatment. Id.
67
Id. After the mother and father made the decision together, the mother formed doubts
and did her own research regarding treatment options. Id.
68
Id. at 732. The mother filed the “petition for change of custody,” claiming that her
daughter’s treatment was an “extreme emergency,” which was required in order to modify
the child’s custody. Id. at 731–32. The court held that her treatment was an extreme
emergency and ordered the mother to return her daughter to Indiana and the father once
treatment ended. Id. at 732. However, the daughter remained in her mother’s custody
after the treatment ended. Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 733. The court also found that the mother was better able to care for her
daughter during the treatment. Id. at 734. Therefore, the court held that the mother would
be more able to meet her daughter’s emotional and physical needs during treatment. Id.
71
See supra Part II.A.4.
72
See infra notes 92–106 and accompanying text.
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B. Life-Support Decisions and Disputes
Similar to medical treatment disputes, parents may also disagree
over whether to remove their child from life-support.73 Competent
adults are legally capable of making the decision to end life-sustaining
treatment directly, either through a living will or by appointing a
representative as power of attorney.74 However, if the patient is legally
incompetent, such as a child, then state statutes and courts appoint a
surrogate to make decisions for the patient.75 Because parents are
typically surrogate decision-makers for their children, they may become
embroiled in disputes over whether to remove their child’s lifesupport.76 If a life-support dispute arises, then courts will make the
decision, generally applying one of two methods: the best interests
standard or the subjective judgment standard.77 In addition, mediation
has recently been suggested as an alternative approach to resolve
disputes between family members over the course of the incompetent’s
treatment.78
1.

The Rights of Patients on Life-Support

The United States Supreme Court has held that competent adults
have a recognized liberty interest to decline medical treatment, including
life-support.79 Competent adults retain the right to deny life-support in
order to preserve independence and dignity at the end of life.80 By
See infra notes 92–106 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
75
See infra notes 84–91 and accompanying text.
76
See infra notes 92–103 and accompanying text.
77
See infra Part II.B.2.
78
See infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
79
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (stating that prior decisions support the view that
competent adults have the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); Alicia R. Ouellette,
When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients
by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 IND. L. J. 1, 6 (2004) (“[I]n all states, competent
patients can refuse any and all treatment.”). In Glucksberg, the Court stated that “‘the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.’” 521 U.S. at 725.
80
Glucksberg, at 716; see also Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should
Minors Have a Right To Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 4 (1996).
Most importantly, life-sustaining treatment decisions shape the
definition of one’s entire life. These decisions affect one’s core values
and the way one will live the remainder of one’s life. For example,
some think it is better to live regardless of the degree of suffering,
while others would rather die than be forced to suffer for the
remainder of their lives. For others still, living a life of dependency
73
74
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executing a living will, a competent adult can inform his medical
professionals as to his wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment.81 A
living will also reassures the patient that his wishes will be fulfilled
should he become incompetent, and it comforts the patient’s loved ones
who would otherwise be forced to make the decision for the patient.82
Adults can also create a health care power of attorney document that
specifies the person who will make decisions for the adult if the adult
becomes incompetent.83 However, if the patient is legally incompetent,
he cannot make life-sustaining decisions for himself.84 Instead, state
statutes and courts authorize a surrogate, usually a family member, to
make decisions for the incompetent patient.85

would be intolerable, undermining their core values of independence
and autonomy. Failing to allow the patient to make this decision will
cause irreparable harm to personhood; therefore, the law should be
more respectful of the right to self-determination.
Id. at 13–14.
81
LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW 290 (Aspen
2002); Albert B. Crenshaw, Leave a Paper Trail To Save a Ton of Grief, WASH. POST, May 30,
2004, at F01, available at LEXIS, News & Business, ALLNWS File. Advance medical
directives have gained popularity recently. Karen M. Thomas & Michael Precker, A Living
Will Can Help Answer Tough Questions and Avoid Legal Battles, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
20, 2003, available at LEXIS, General News & Information, Dalnws File (stating that since the
Terri Schiavo case received widespread media attention, requests at a non-profit
organization for living will brochures have increased tenfold). All fifty states recognize
advance directives. Lynda M. Tarantino, Withdrawal of Life Support: Conflict Among Patient
Wishes, Family, Physicians, Courts and Statutes, and the Law, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 623, 634 (1994).
However, state statutes that authorize living wills do not allow children to create them no
matter how high the child’s level of maturity. Rosato, supra note 80, at 4; see also, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3261 (West 2003) (stating that an adult may prepare a living will);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.302 (West 2005) (stating that only competent adults may make a
living will); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 (West 2005) (declaring that only competent adults
may create a living will); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a) (2004) (“Any competent adult may
execute at any time a living will or medical power of attorney.”).
82
Directives a Gift to Family, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Nov. 3, 2003, at A08, available at
2003 WLNR 13520939.
83
HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 81, at 290. A patient is incompetent if he lacks the
capacity to make informed decisions. Id. A person can lose capacity or may never have
had capacity, such as a child or the mentally disabled. Id.
84
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990). In Cruzan, the Court
stated that “[a]n incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice
to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a ‘right’ must
be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.” Id.
85
THOMAS L. HAFEMEISTER & PAULA L. HANNAFORD, RESOLVING DISPUTES OVER LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT 10 (1996); see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11 (2004) (listing those
able to make the surrogate decision for patients as a court appointed guardian, a spouse, an
adult child, a parent, or an adult sibling); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie 2004) (listing
those able to make a decision for a minor or an adult who is incompetent as the legal
guardian, parents, spouse, adult child, adult siblings, “persons standing in loco parentis,”
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Similar to other incompetent patients, children have the right to
refuse medical treatment through a surrogate.86 Because a child does not
have the ability to decide whether to maintain life-sustaining treatment,
the parent makes the decision for the child.87 The parental right to act as
a surrogate decision-maker stems from the parents’ right to make
general medical decisions concerning their children.88 Parents are in the
best position to make that decision because it is presumed that they
know and are likely to act in their child’s best interest.89 The state also
and a majority of the patient’s adult heirs at law); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507 (2003 &
Supp. 2004) (listing those able to make decisions in the following order: spouse, adult
child, parent, adult sibling, adult grandchild, and adult niece or nephew); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-36-1-5 (West 1999) (also listing a spouse, adult child, parent, adult sibling, adult
grandchild, and adult niece or nephew as those able to make decisions); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.631 (Michie 2004) (listing the patient’s judicially-appointed guardian, the
person named as durable power of attorney, the patient’s spouse, the patient’s adult child,
the patient’s parents, and the patient’s nearest living relative). Legislators and courts
consider family members to be in the best position to make decisions for the incompetent
patient for three reasons. HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra at 17. First, they are in the
best position to know what the patient would have wanted had he been able to decide. Id.
Second, family members are likely to have the same interests as the patient and therefore
they are most likely to promote the patient’s interests. Id. Third, in general, people would
choose a family member to be their surrogate. Id.; see also Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics
Discourse To Determine When Parents Should Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is
Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (stating that family members are in the best
position to make life-sustaining treatment decisions for their loved ones, and that this is
especially true when considering the alternatives).
86
ARTHUR S. BERGER, DYING AND DEATH IN LAW AND MEDICINE 105 (1993); see also
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (“It is not disputed that a child, in common with
adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment and that the state’s involvement in the commitment decision constitutes state
action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
87
HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 81, at 290. This is because minors are not deemed
mature enough to make life-support decisions for themselves. Id. Children may make the
decision for themselves if the court finds that they are mature enough. JAMES M.
MORRISSEY & ADELE D. HOFMANN, CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 15 (1986). According to the mature minor doctrine, a minor is
capable of consenting to medical treatment so long as she is “sufficiently mature or
intelligent to understand and appreciate the benefits and risks of the proposed treatment.”
Id. The court will look at the age of the patient, the minor’s intellectual maturity, and the
minor’s ability to understand the information needed to make an informed decision. Id. at
16. For further discussion on minors making their own decisions concerning life-sustaining
treatment, see Rosato, supra note 80. The author argues that mature minors should be able
to make their own medical decisions. Id. at 4. Many states also have statutes that create
exceptions to the general parental consent requirement for medical treatment if the medical
impairment falls within certain categories, such as treatment for substance abuse,
pregnancy, or sexually transmitted diseases. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 20, at 769.
88
See supra Part II.A.1.
89
HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 85, at 35; see also BERGER, supra note 86, at 106
(stating that the natural bonds of love and affection guide the parent to make a decision in
the best interests of the child).
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has an interest in the decision to continue or halt a child’s life-sustaining
treatment, and it can act as parens patriae90 if the child’s parents do not
adequately protect the child’s best interests.91 These three interests are
competing and can result in disputes over sustaining the child’s lifesupport.92
For example, in In re Doe,93 a thirteen-year-old girl had a
degenerative brain disease and was expected to remain incapacitated.94
Her parents were married, but they disagreed over whether to end her

90
Matthew S. Feigenbaum, Note, Minors, Medical Treatment, and Interspousal
Disagreement: Should Solomon Split the Child?, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 841, 855 (1992). Parens
patriae is “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for
themselves.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
91
Feigenbaum, supra note 90, at 855–56; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (“[A] State may properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’
of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in
the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected
interests of the individual.”); Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 (“Nonetheless, we have recognized
that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with
children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”).
92
See Debra Jasper & Spencer Hunt, Keeping Evan Alive, Barely; Mercy or Hope?,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, available at http://www.enquirer.com/extremechoices/loc_extreme
babiesside.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (recounting the story of a two-year-old boy on
life support whose parents were arguing over whether the child should receive lifesustaining treatment; the mother wanted to take the child off life-support, but the father
wanted everything possible to be done); see also Infant, CITY NEWS SERVICE, May 15, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News & Business, CNS File (describing the ruling in a dispute between a
mother and father over whether to remove their child’s life-support in which the court held
that neither of the parents were fit to make the decision because both were charged with
abusing the child). Similarly, there may be disputes between the parents and legally
appointed guardians. See Court Rules Boy Must Stay On Life Support, KANSAS CITY STAR,
June 12, 2004, at A8, available at 2004 WL 919470 (describing the dispute between a sevenmonth-old baby’s parents and his court-appointed legal guardian and the court’s holding
that the boy should remain on life-support during the dispute); Father Disputes Removal of
Son’s Life Support, CANCER WEEKLY, Nov. 9, 2004, at 120, available at 2004 WLNR 4925631
(portraying the dispute between the father of a six-year-old boy who claimed his son had
some voluntary movement and a hospital’s doctors who pronounced the boy brain-dead,
and in which the court ordered a restraining order against the doctors from removing the
boy’s life-support); Carrie Spencer, Court:
Guardian Can’t End Tot’s Life Support,
CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 31, 2004, at A3, available at 2004 WLNR 15664261 (describing the
dispute between a court-appointed guardian who wanted to remove life-support from a
brain-damaged baby and the father who was accused of shaking the baby and causing his
injuries).
93
418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992).
94
Id. at 4. Although the girl had medical problems since birth, her doctors believed she
would recover. Id. However, her condition deteriorated over the following weeks. Id.
Within one month of entering the hospital, doctors put Jane Doe on a respirator. Id. Over
the next few months, she had multiple infections and her mental capacity declined. Id.
Doctors then surgically placed her on breathing and feeding tubes. Id.
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life-support treatment.95 The mother wanted to de-escalate life support
treatment while the father did not.96 The hospital then sought a
declaratory judgment to determine which parent should have the
authority to make the decision.97 The court held that either parent could
revoke the consent for de-escalating life-sustaining treatment if there
were two custodial parents who were actively participating in making
the medical decisions for the child.98
In an unusual case decided by the Superior Court in Georgia, the
dispute over whether to keep the child on life-sustaining equipment was
between the child’s father and the husband of the child’s mother.99 The
life-support was sustaining the mother’s body and therefore sustaining
the life of the child.100 The husband of the woman wanted to end the lifesustaining treatment for the mother and the baby.101 However, the father
of the child wanted to continue the life-sustaining treatment for the
mother in order to keep the child alive.102 The hospital obtained a court
order to keep the woman alive so that the child could survive.103 Also, in
a recent Iowa case, a court held that it lacked the authority to decide

Id. The doctors discussed signing a do-not-resuscitate order with the parents. Id. The
mother agreed, but the father did not want to sign the order that would stop the physicians
from resuscitating his daughter if she suffered cardiac arrest. Id.
96
Id. The mother then sought a decision from the hospital’s ethics committee. Id. The
committee agreed with the mother that the child’s life-support should be de-escalated. Id.
97
Id. The hospital believed that if it continued to aggressively treat Jane Doe it would
“[constitute] medical abuse.” Id. However, it was not asking the court for the power to
make the decision for the parents. Id. Before the court could render a decision, the mother
changed her mind, refusing de-escalation of treatment and disagreeing with the hospital.
Id.
98
Id. at 7. The court reasoned that the parents and the medical community were in the
best position to make life-sustaining treatment decisions. Id. at 6.
99
Ruling by a Court Keeps Fetus Alive, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1986, at 17, available at 1986
WLNR 836059. The wife’s husband admitted that he was not the father of his wife’s
twenty-one-week-old fetus. Id.
100
Id. (describing that although the mother was brain dead, she was on life-support
because she was five months pregnant).
101
Id. At the time the court order was entered, the mother had been on life-support for
two months. Id. A month after she entered the hospital, her brain stopped functioning and
her husband asked hospital officials to discontinue the use of the life-support systems. Id.
102
Id. The father of the child asked hospital officials to leave the mother on the respirator
and intravenous feeding tube in order to preserve the life of his child. Id.
103
Id. The court held that because the mother was dead, she no longer had a right to
privacy and therefore the state could intervene to save the life of the child. Id. The state
had a paramount interest in protecting the child’s life. Id. The state’s Department of
Family and Children Services did not know of any way to determine the custody of the
child if the fetus were to survive. Id.
95
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whether to remove a divorced couple’s daughter from life support.104
The mother wanted to allow a do-not-resuscitate order to be entered for
her daughter.105 However, the father wanted the child to remain on lifesupport indefinitely in the hope that she may recover.106
Although statutory and common law define who may make
decisions for the incompetent patient, disputes still arise between family
members claiming a right to make decisions for the incompetent
patient.107 Typically, courts are asked to resolve these disputes.108
2.

Approaches to Resolving Disputes

Advances in medical technology, which in turn result in an
extension of life, have led to an increase in lawsuits concerning a
person’s ability to refuse life-sustaining treatment.109 As shown in the
aforementioned cases, family disputes result when family members
disagree over a course of treatment for the incompetent patient.110
104
Family Debates Future of Baby on Life-Support; Brooklyn’s Mother Wants “Do Not
Resuscitate Order”, IOWA CHANNEL, http://www.theiowachannel.com/news/2039442/
detail.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Brooklyn Mother].
105
Id. A do-not-resuscitate order is a “document, executed by a competent person,
directing that if the person’s heartbeat and breathing both cease while in a hospital, nursing
home, or similar facility, no attempts to restore heartbeat or breathing should be made.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 526–27 (8th ed. 2004).
106
Brooklyn Mother, supra note 104. However, this case was complicated because the
father was the parent at home with the child when the child was in the bathtub and nearly
drowned, causing her incapacitation. Id.
107
See supra notes 84–106 and accompanying text.
108
See infra Part II.B.2.
109
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (stating that lawsuits
over the right to refuse life have “burgeoned” due to important developments in medical
technology); see also Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating Endof-Life Treatment Disputes To Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 79 B.U.L. Rev.
1091, 1092 (1999) (stating that disputes over life-support “routinely arise” between patients,
family members, and physicians).
110
Martha Bellisle, End of Life Planning, RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Nov. 23, 2003, at 1A,
available at LEXIS, General News & Information, Reno File; see also Don Colburn & Ashbel
S. Green, Judge Refuses To Reorder Life Support, OREGONIAN, Nov. 18, 2003, at AO1, available
at 2003 WL 3837037 (recounting the story of a sister fighting the rest of her family to keep
her brother on life support); Bruce Nolan, Siblings Split Over Ending Life of Mother Stroke
Victim’s Living Will Does Not Preclude Withholding Food, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 12, 2004, at 1,
available at 2004 WL 1511429 (narrating the story of an elderly woman on feeding tubes
whose children were divided over whether to remove the tubes). The infamous case of
Terri Schiavo also illustrates how bitter disputes over ending a loved one’s life-sustaining
treatment can get. Schiavo was being sustained only through artificial feeding. Thorny
Right-To-Die Case Before Florida High Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at A4, available at
2004 WLNR 1776304. Her husband claimed that she did not want to be on life-support, but
her parents refused to remove the feeding tube. Id. The dispute went on for six years until
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Courts generally use the following two approaches to resolve disputes
regarding life-sustaining treatment when the patient is incompetent: the
subjective-judgment standard and the best interests test.111 Courts that
utilize the subjective judgment standard attempt to determine the
patient’s preferences if the patient had been able to decide.112
Alternatively, if the patient had never discussed his preferences or the
Florida’s Governor Jeb Bush stepped in and ordered, through special legislation, that her
feeding tube remain inserted. Id. Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida struck down the
special legislation, and the governor asked that it reconsider. Jackie Hallifax, Bush Asks
Justices for Rehearing on Schiavo Law, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 5, 2004, at 5B, available at 2004
WLNR 6273032. Despite the involvement of both Congress and the President on the side of
the parents, Schiavo’s husband finally prevailed. William Yardley, On the Day After,
Attending to the Details of Death, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A8. Terri Schiavo died on
March 18, 2005, approximately two weeks after her feeding tubes had been removed. Id.
Disagreements between family members may only be a need for time to adjust.
HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 85, at 21. Other potential reasons family members
may disagree include pre-existing family disagreements; insufficient discussion about the
decision; frustration over the patient being sick; and differences in the family members’
backgrounds, experiences, culture, ethnicity, and religion. Id. at 23. Family members may
also disagree because they differ in the ability to understand the medical concepts, “the
weight they attach to small probabilities and their relative views on risk taking and risk
avoidance; [] their views of the benefits and burdens attached to specific treatments; [] their
views about quality of life; or [] their trust in the medical profession.” Diane E. Hoffman,
Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 821, 837 (1994). However, in the vast
majority of cases, family members are able to agree on a course of treatment for the
incompetent patient. HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 85, at 2.
111
HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 85, at 18–19; see also Melinda T. Derish &
Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have the Right To Refuse Life-Sustaining
Medical Treatment, 28 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 109, 112 (2000) (stating that courts either use the
best-interests test or the subjective judgment approach). Compare In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905,
913 (Pa. 1996) (holding that under the substituted judgment standard a woman could
consent to remove her sister from life support), with In re Guardianship of Myers, 610
N.E.2d 663, 776 (Ohio 1993) (holding that, under the best interests standard, a minor should
be removed from life-support).
112
HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 85, at 18–19. The subjective judgment
approach is a “surrogate’s good-faith inquiry into the patient’s values, beliefs, and
lifestyle” to determine what the incompetent patient would have wanted. Id. at 18; see also,
e.g., In re Roche, 687 A.2d 349, 352 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (stating that if a patient is
incompetent, the surrogate decision-maker must determine what the incompetent patient
would have decided). This approach is further divided into the following two sub-types:
the subjective standard and the limited objective standard. Feigenbaum, supra note 90, at
865. Using the subjective standard, courts only recognize the “clearly expressed intent” of
the individual regarding life-sustaining treatment. Id. The court looks only to what that
person would choose if the patient were able to choose, even if what the patient would
choose is unreasonable. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 516 (2003). In contrast, courts that use the
limited objective standard consider a substitute judgment if the incompetent patient has
not clearly expressed his intent. Id. This standard requires some trustworthy evidence that
the patient would have decided to withdraw life-sustaining treatment and that the benefits
of removing the patient from life support substantially outweigh the burdens of continuing
life-sustaining treatment. Id.
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patient had always been incompetent, such as a child, courts may use
the best interests test.113 Similar to the best interests custody standard
courts use when making a custody determination, courts use the lifesupport best interests test to determine the most beneficial course of
treatment for the individual.114 Likewise, courts look at many factors,
balancing the possible suffering and pain of the patient against the
benefits of keeping the patient on life-support.115 Under this approach,
courts do not subjectively judge what the incompetent patient would
have wanted.116
In addition to the subjective judgment approach and the best
interests test, alternative dispute resolution has been proposed as
another method to resolve end-of-life decision-making disputes.117
Alternative dispute resolution is less expensive than litigation because it
can proceed more quickly than the judicial system and it takes into
account other issues, such as the values and emotions of those
involved.118 However, some critics have argued that mediation is not a
plausible method for resolving life-support disputes because they
believe there are only two sides to the dispute, either terminate lifesupport or sustain it, and parties on either side are unlikely to
acquiesce.119 Nevertheless, proponents claim that mediation will help
Feigenbaum, supra note 90, at 866; see also In re Roche, 687 A.2d at 352 (stating that if
“no reliable evidence of an incompetent’s subjective intent exists, the decision maker
should use a pure-objective test, or best interests test”).
114
BERGER, supra note 86, at 105 (stating that it is assumed that the patient would have
chosen what is in his best interests if he had been able to choose).
115
HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 85, at 19 (finding that courts usually look at
objective medical criteria, the amount of enjoyment or suffering the patient will experience,
and the likelihood that the patient will recover); see also In re Roche, 687 A.2d at 352 (“[T]he
net burdens of the patient’s life with the treatment should clearly outweigh the benefits
that the patient derives from life, if the guardian is to deny or withdraw treatment.”).
116
Feigenbaum, supra note 90, at 867; see also BERGER, supra note 86, at 105 (stating that
the best interests test should be applied when there is not enough information to know
what the patient would have wanted in order to utilize the subjective judgment test or
when the patient was never competent, such as a child).
117
See Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-Making, 9 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 314 (2004) (proposing an alternative dispute resolution model for endof-life decision-making); Hoffmann, supra note 110, at 825 (claiming that mediation is more
useful than litigation to resolve termination of life-support disputes).
118
Cohen, supra note 117, at 284. Cohen identified six benefits of alternative dispute
resolution: (1) it provides a faster resolution to the dispute than litigation; (2) it does not
lump solutions into predetermined categories; (2) it allows for confrontation of the values
inherent to life-support decisions; (4) it increases “patient autonomy”; (5) it allows those
involved in the dispute not only to resolve the dispute but also to address their emotions;
(6) alternative dispute resolution has “flexibility in managing multiple parties.” Id.
119
Id. at 271. The author describes the common criticism of using mediation in end-oflife disputes, that “death and dying decision-making is different; there are only two
113
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family members realize that there really is not a dispute, but only a
misunderstanding based on incomplete knowledge of the medical
prognosis and views on what the patient would have wanted.120 Similar
to custody mediation, but unlike litigation, mediation for disputes
concerning life-support allows the parties involved to articulate their
feelings.121
Although the courts and statutes have identified who has a superior
right to make decisions for incompetent patients on life-support, such as
children, disputes still arise. However, disagreements over ending lifesustaining treatment are not the only end-of-life decisions that cause
conflicts, as burial decisions are also prone to disputes between family
members.122

possible outcomes (discontinue treatment or do not) and the parties are diametrically
opposed to one another—there is no place for ADR here.” Id.
120
Id. at 275 (“[C]onflicts [are] often fueled by different perceptions of the medical facts,
different understandings of the prognosis, different interpretations of patient behavior . . .
and different personal value hierarchies.”). The author also claims that there are not only
two options in end-of-life decisions, but a full range of solutions that fall between life and
death. Id. at 272. The author also states:
ADR does have a role to play even in a dispute as seemingly positional
as that of the death and dying context because it may (1) help to
resolve “misunderstandings” that the adjudicatory system tends to
treat as full-blown “disputes,” (2) identify intermediate options that
satisfy both parties and remove the need for rights-oriented dispute
resolution, (3) offer a lower form of rights-oriented adjudication when
a dispute must be decided, and (4) offer emotional resolution lacking
in the typical litigation process. These four benefits will not accrue in
every case, but they are important enough and occur often enough to
justify implementation of an ADR program that retains litigation as a
final step.
Id. at 276. Mediation is based upon the assumption that “there are a variety of solutions to
the issues raised all of which are potentially acceptable to the disputants (neither disputant
has to lose, both, in fact, can win).” Hoffman, supra note 110, at 825. “[F]amily members
may disagree about what it is that the patient would have wanted.” Id. at 837. Family
members may also disagree among themselves as to what is best for the patient. Just as in
disputes between providers and family members, this can be due to differences among
family members in “(1) their ability to understand important medical concepts; (2) the
weight they attach to small probabilities and their relative views on risk taking and risk
avoidance; (3) their views of the benefits and burdens attached to specific treatments; (4)
their views about quality of life; or (5) their trust in the medical profession.” Id. at 837.
121
Cohen, supra note 117, at 276. Allowing family members to air their feelings is
especially important because “when feelings are at the heart of what’s going on, they are
the business at hand and ignoring them is nearly impossible.” Id. at 299. “These cases
must include a process for emotional settlement not simply resolution of the ‘legal’ or
‘ethical’ issues.” Id. at 825.
122
See infra Part II.C.
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C. Burial Disputes
In addition to life-support decisions, interment decisions must be
made at the end of a person’s life.123 Similar to the life-support statutes,
burial right statutes list those who have the right to bury the deceased.124
However, disputes often arise between family members, including the
parents of divorced children, over the authority to make interment
decisions.125
1.

Burial Decision-Making Rights

Those closest to the deceased generally have the right and duty to
ensure that the deceased is buried quickly, properly, and with care.126
Many states have statutes that define a hierarchy of decision-making
authority over the deceased.127 In addition, several states require the
See infra Part II.C.1.
See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
125
See Brian L. Josias, Note, Burying the Hatchet in Burial Disputes: Applying Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Disputes Concerning the Interment of Bodies, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1141, 1145–46 (2004) (stating that disputes are common and reviewing the several different
acceptable methods of interment: burial above ground, burial below ground, cremation,
and cryogenic freezing). These decisions will continue to become more difficult as
technology advances. Id. at 1141. People can also be excluded from the funeral services of
the dead. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 6 (2002).
126
See Lum v. Fullaway, 42 Haw. 500, 516 (1958) (stating that due to public health
concerns and respect for the deceased, the next-of-kin have the right and duty to bury a
loved one); Messina v. La Rosa, 150 N.E.2d 5, 7–8 (Mass. 1958) (stating that a husband has
the duty and right to bury his wife); Caen v. Feld, 371 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Mo. 1963) (stating
that those who have the duty to bury also have a right to bury the deceased, and that a
man’s daughters had the right and duty to bury their father); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A.
878, 879 (Pa. 1904) (“When a man dies, public policy and regard for the public health, as
well as the universal sense of propriety, require that his body should be decently cared for
and disposed of.”).
127
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-831 (West Supp. 2004) (declaring that the spouse
has the paramount right, followed by parents if the person was a minor, adult children, or
any person or organization willing to accept responsibility, and if none of these are
available, then the person who is able to pay for the funeral); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY. CODE
§ 7100 (West 2004) (listing the order of the persons with right to the deceased’s body as the
person who has power of attorney, surviving spouse, surviving child or the majority of the
surviving children, parents, other next-of-kin, but if there is no family, then the funeral
director may make the decisions); MO. ANN. STAT. § 194.119 (West 2004) (listing the
hierarchy as the spouse, child if over 18, parent, sibling, next-of-kin, any other relative, any
friend that takes the financial responsibility for the deceased’s burial, and finally, the
county coroner); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-19-101 (2003) (listing the spouse, majority of adult
children, parent, close relative, or someone designated by the deceased in a preneed
document); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.130 (2003) (listing the spouse, adult child, either parent,
sibling, guardian, or next-of-kin as able to make burial decisions if the deceased did not
leave specific written instructions concerning burial); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-8-320 (Supp.
2004) (declaring that cremation can be ordered by the agent of the estate, then the spouse,
123
124
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next-of-kin to follow any interment instructions from the deceased.128
The deceased’s next-of-kin have the authority to make the interment
decisions or carry out the wishes of the deceased because they are
considered decisions of trust, and those closest to the deceased are likely
to understand that the death affects the many people who were involved
in the deceased person’s life.129 Funeral services provide an outlet for the
deceased’s loved ones to grieve or to provide comfort to others who are
grieving.130 Helping to plan the burial or funeral also aids those close to
the deceased to come to terms with the death of their loved one,
especially when the death is unexpected.131 However, the interment
process can be one that is complex and involves powerful emotions,
which may lead to dissension.132

adult children, parents, or the next-of-kin, unless the deceased had designated a method of
interment or designated a decision-maker in a preneed document); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 711.002 (Vernon 2004) (listing the order as the person named in a document signed
by the deceased, the spouse, the adult children, either parent, any sibling, or the next-ofkin); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160 (West 2004) (declaring the order as the deceased’s
spouse, adult children, parents, siblings, or a person designated through a signed
document by the deceased).
128
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100.1 (West 2004) (stating that a person may
declare how he wants to be buried in a written instrument or in his will); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 97.130 (2003)(1) (stating that if an adult prepares a written instrument declaring his
preferred method of interment or prearranges an interment method or services, those
wishes must be followed); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-8-320 (2003) (stating that next-of-kin may
make interment decisions only if the deceased had not created a preneed document);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160(1) (West 2004) (stating that people have the right to
direct how their remains shall be interred); In re Application Pursuant to Article 4200 of
Pub. Health Law, 196 Misc.2d 599, 600 (Supreme Court Nassau NY 2003) (stating that
although a deceased’s next-of-kin usually have the right to make burial decisions, the
deceased’s wishes are paramount over wishes of the family).
129
S. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 105 So. 161, 166 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925) (“[T]he right
to possession and disposition is in a sense a trust to be exercised for all having affection for
the deceased and an interest in seeing the body decently interred.”); Estes v. Woodlawn
Mem’l Park, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that there is a “sacred
trust” for the benefit of family and friends who also care about the deceased). Historically,
families had the duty to prepare the body for burial because the mortuary industry did not
exist until the 1880s. Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 992
(1999).
130
Hernandez, supra note 129, at 991. By participating in the decision-making process,
loved ones of the deceased can show their affection for the deceased, which is “thereby an
extension of a caregiver’s role. Furthermore, primary participation in the death ritual is a
public acknowledgment of the survivor’s importance to the decedent and vice-versa.” Id;
see also Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 138 S.E.2d 214, 215–16 (N.C. 1964) (stating that the
next-of-kin have an emotional interest in burying the body of a loved one).
131
Hernandez, supra note 129, at 991.
132
Josias, supra note 125, at 1145 (stating that making burial decisions places a large
amount of pressure on the decision-maker because the decision is usually final); see also
Hernandez, supra note 129, at 992 (stating that if a deceased’s chosen family bars the
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Decision-Making Rights and Burial Disputes

Decisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the body are
ripe with potential disputes.133 These conflicts can make the loss of a
loved one more difficult and can carry on for years after the death.134
Typically, interment disputes are resolved in the state court systems.135
Courts must make the decisions concerning the funeral and burial for the
families, or they must decide who should have the right to make the
decision.136
Disputes over the interment of the deceased create an even more
complicated issue for the divorced parents of a deceased minor child.137
Parents may argue over who is allowed to attend the funeral services,138
the allocation of the interment costs,139 and the method used to dispose
deceased’s biological family from attending or participating in the deceased’s funeral, it
can cause “anguish”).
133
See Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170 (Cal. 1900) (resolving a dispute between wife and the
husband’s girlfriend over the right to bury the husband’s body); Chris Seper, Widow Finds
the Urn Bare, Blames Relatives for Taking Ashes, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 27, 2000, at
1B, available at LEXIS, General News & Information, ClevPD File (recounting the family
dispute between the wife and the relatives over the cremated husband’s remains in which
the relatives stole the husband’s ashes from the cemetery to scatter in a lake, and the person
who took the ashes faced the potential charges of theft and vandalism); Nancy St. Pierre,
Family Dispute Keeps Body at Mortuary; Court Ruling Awaited on Burial Rights, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 4, 1992, at 29A, available at LEXIS, General News & Information,
Dalnws File (reporting the story of a husband fighting his wife’s parents for the right to
bury his wife); Ted Williams’ Daughter Drops Case Against Alcor, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June
17, 2004, at OE, available at 2004 WLNR 9833374 (stating that Ted Williams’ son had a note
from his father professing his wish to be cryogenically frozen, but his daughter believed he
wanted to be cremated). In addition, the person who has legal custody of the body has
legal rights to the body and interference with those rights can create a cause of action. S.
Life, 105 So. at 167.
134
See Seper, supra note 133 (reporting a burial dispute that lasted for more than one
decade); St. Pierre, supra note 133 (reporting that a woman’s body was in a funeral home
for five months after her death, awaiting either a court order or the woman’s family to
settle the disagreement over burial arrangement).
135
Josias, supra note 125, at 1157.
136
22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 2 (2003) (stating that courts should be neutral in
deciding burial disputes).
137
See infra notes 138–75 and accompanying text.
138
See Tully v. Pate, 372 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D.S.C. 1973) (holding that the father did not
have a right to attend his children’s funeral); Rader v. Davis, 134 N.W. 849, 850 (Iowa 1912)
(holding that the father had no right to attend his son’s funeral if the mother did not want
him to attend).
139
See Jones v. Jones, 883 So. 2d 207, 213 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (holding that the father
was required to pay one-half of the funeral expenses although the mother had full
custody); Peppers v. Smith, 261 S.E.2d 427, 429 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (allowing the mother,
the full custodial parent of the deceased child, to bring suit against the father for burial
expenses); Stott v. Stott, 737 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that although the
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of the body.140 Generally, the parent who has legal custody of the child
retains the right to the child’s body and to make all decisions concerning
the interment.141 For example, Missouri’s burial statute states that if a
parent has sole custody, then that parent makes all of the decisions
concerning the child’s burial.142 If the parents have joint custody, then
the parent who lives at the mailing address of the child shall make the
decisions.143
The court in Rader v. Davis144 resolved a burial dispute between the
divorced parents of a deceased child.145 The father of a young deceased
boy brought suit against his ex-father-in-law who did not want the boy’s
father to attend the funeral.146 Although the mother had full custody of

mother had full custody of the child, the father had to pay the funeral expenses for his
deceased daughter because he had received a settlement from the child’s life insurance
policy); Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 144 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tenn. 1940) (holding that
funeral expenses are a necessity to be paid by the parents, and therefore the father needed
to pay one-third of the burial expenses).
140
See Tully, 372 F. Supp. at 1073 (holding that the father had no right to determine how
his children should be interred); Robinson v. Robinson, 237 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Ark. 1951)
(holding that the father had no legal right to control the disposition of the remains of his
child); In re Admin. of K.A., 807 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the
child’s remains should be cremated, agreeing with the father and disagreeing with the
mother).
141
Tully, 372 F. Supp. at 1073.
142
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 194.119(2)(3)(a)–(c) (2004). The statute states, in pertinent part, that
the right of burial belongs to:
(3)(a) Any surviving parent of the deceased; or
(b) If the deceased is a minor, a surviving parent who has custody of
the minor; or
(c) If the deceased is a minor and the deceased’s parents have joint
custody, the parent whose residence is the minor child’s residence for
purposes of mailing and education
Id.
143
Id.
144
134 N.W. 849 (Iowa 1912).
145
Id. at 850; see also Robinson v. Robinson, 237 S.W.2d 20 (Ark. 1951). In Robinson, the
court held that the custodial parent had the right to possession of the deceased child’s body
for the purposes of burial. 237 S.W.2d at 22. The father had sole custody, and the mother
had visitation rights. Id. at 21. However, the custody agreement also stated that if the
mother decided to return to California, then she could take the child with her. Id. She did
so, and the child died in a car accident while in California. Id. The court reasoned that the
custody decree gave the mother custody of the child once she took the child to California.
Id. Therefore, the father no longer had custody and no longer had any rights to the
possession of his child’s body for the purposes of burial. Id. at 22.
146
Rader, 134 N.W. at 850. The mother’s father owned the home where the child’s funeral
was held, and he did not want his ex-son-in-law entering his house. Id. Therefore, the
father could not attend his child’s funeral. Id.
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the small child, the father had regular visitation.147 The court held that
because the mother had full custody of the child, she had the right to
make all decisions concerning the child’s funeral and burial.148 The
father did not have custody, and thus had no right to attend the child’s
funeral, to make burial decisions, or to possess his son’s body.149
Reasoning that because the funeral was not held out as a public funeral,
the father of the dead child did not have the right to enter his ex-wife’s
father’s home.150 The court stated that even if the sole reason for barring
the boy’s father from attending the funeral was to hurt the father, he still
would not have a right to attend the funeral.151
Similarly, in Tully v. Pate,152 the court held that the custodial mother
had the sole right to make decisions for her children’s burial.153 In Tully,
the father of two children was denied attendance at his children’s
funeral.154 The mother had a temporary custody order while the parents’
divorce was pending.155 The father brought suit for interference with his
Id. at 849. The custody decree stated that the mother was “awarded the full care,
custody and control” of her son, and that she had to pay all the expenses of raising her son.
Id. The decree also gave the father the right to visit his son “at reasonable times and places,
without in any manner harassing or annoying the [mother].” Id. In a later custody decree,
the court recognized that the mother was living with her father and that the home was not
“a suitable place” for the boy’s father to visit his son. Id. Also in this later decree, the
father was ordered to pay child support, and if he failed to pay, he would no longer have
visitation rights. Id. at 850.
148
Id. Although the boy’s mother made all of the funeral arrangements for her son,
including deciding who should attend the funeral, there was evidence that it was the boy’s
grandfather who did not want the father in his home. Id.
149
Id. The father argued that, although he did not pay child support and had not visited
his child since the new decree, the child’s illness changed the situation. Id. He believed
that he should then have been able to visit the child while the child was sick and attend the
funeral. Id.
150
Id.; see also Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W. 871, 873 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912). In Seaton,
the extended family of a deceased infant brought suit against the father of the infant
because he failed to notify them of the infant’s death so that they could be present at the
burial. 149 S.W. at 873. The court held that although the relatives may be hurt, they had no
legal right to attend the infant’s burial. Id. The court reasoned that the funeral did not
have to be open to the relatives because different customs dictate different types of
funerals. Id. The court stated that some funerals have been held by strict invitation, some
were private, and some were open to the public. Id. The court reasoned that only those
who had the authority to make the burial decisions had the right to determine who should
attend the funeral. Id.
151
Rader, 134 N.W. at 851.
152
372 F. Supp. 1064 (D.S.C. 1973).
153
Id. at 1073.
154
Id. at 1068. The father also had custody of the three older children from the marriage,
and they also were not allowed to attend their sibling’s funeral. Id.
155
Id. at 1073. Before the mother obtained temporary custody, she took the two children
out of state for the Thanksgiving holiday, promising to return a day later. Id. at 1067.
147
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burial rights.156 In its decision, the court reasoned that the mother had
sole custody at the time of the children’s death and that it was irrelevant
if the custody was temporary or permanent.157 The court reasoned that
because divorced parents often already had damaged relationships, they
were unlikely to be able to make decisions together concerning a child’s
burial without inevitably arguing.158 In the case at hand, the court found
this to be true because the parents were prone to disagreeing and the
father was probably only pursuing a court case for vindictive reasons.159
In addition, the court observed that holding otherwise would result in a
stalemate where no decision would be reached.160 Logic dictated that
because the custodial parent had the right to make all other decisions,
she should also have the right to make this decision.161
Unlike the decision in Tully, in In re Administration of K.A.,162 the
court held that the custodial parent did not have the sole right to
possession of the child’s remains.163 In this case, the mother of a
However, she did not return and obtained the temporary custody order by telephone. Id.
at 1067–68.
156
Id. at 1066. The father brought suit against the mother’s sister who was making the
funeral arrangements while the mother was still in the hospital. Id. at 1073. The father
brought suit for “malicious, willful, deliberate, and intentional interference with [his] burial
rights” and “malicious, willful, deliberate and intentional prevention of attendance” of the
father and his other children. Id. at 1066.
157
Id. at 1073. The court said that the “question of permanent custody became moot”
once the children passed away. Id.
158
Id. The court stated:
Given the usual strained relations between divorced or separated
parents, the chances are great for disagreement on burial plans. Given
the bitterness between the parents in this case, the possibility of
agreement between them was extremely remote.
In such
circumstances one or the other has to make the decisions or else a
stalemate would result. The logical conclusion is that the parent
having custody should also have the right to make the funeral and
burial arrangements.
Id.
159
Id. at 1066.
160
Id.
161
Id. The court also stated that awarding the custodial parent the complete right to
make all interment decisions was practical:
The courts are saved from extended litigation over dead bodies, and
from having the merits or demerits of the causes of the separation and
custody re-litigated. The parents are spared having the misfortune of
death turned into an instrument for inflicting abuse by one upon the
other. The dead are accorded a modicum of respect, rather than being
punted from one side to the other.
Id.
162
807 N.E.2d 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
163
Id. at 751.
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seventeen-year-old child had sole legal custody and the father had
regular visitation, which was similar to the situation in Rader.164 After
their daughter passed away, the parents worked cooperatively, making
the funeral arrangements and the decision to have their daughter
cremated together.165 However, the parents could not agree on what to
do with their daughter’s ashes once she was cremated.166 The father
wanted part of his daughter’s ashes.167 The mother claimed that her
daughter wanted her ashes spread in three separate locations.168 The
funeral home refused to release the ashes to either parent until the
parents came to a joint decision.169
The court held that the parents had to split the ashes evenly.170
Instead of following the decision in Tully, the court looked to the state’s
burial statute and not to the state’s child custody laws.171 Because the
interment statute did not distinguish between the custodial and noncustodial parents, the court held that they were equally entitled to the

Id. at 749. The parties disputed over exactly how much contact he had with his
daughter. Ron Browning, Ashes Split Between Parents, IND. LAW., May 19, 2004, at 1.
165
In re Admin. of K.A, 807 N.E.2d at 749.
166
Id. During the parents’ original meeting at the funeral home, the mother indicated
that she did not want a memorial or headstone for her daughter. Id. The mother also
stated that she intended to distribute the daughter’s ashes in the three locations her
daughter had indicated. Id. At this time, the father did not object to the mother’s decisions.
Id. However, sometime after this initial meeting, the daughter’s stepmother told the
mother that she and the father wanted to erect a memorial stone. Id. The mother did not
object to this idea at the time the stepmother made the statement. Id.
167
Id. at 750.
168
Id. The mother claimed that her daughter told her she wanted her ashes spread on the
coasts of California, Florida, and North Carolina. Id. The father did not believe that those
were his daughter’s wishes and that even if they were, they would not be binding. Id.
169
Id. at 749.
170
Id. at 751.
171
Id. The Indiana statute the court used was IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18 (West 2001):
§ 25-15-9-18. Priority of persons determining final disposition and
interment of human remains
Sec. 18. The following persons, in the order of priority indicated, have
the authority to designate the manner, type, and selection of the final
disposition and interment of human remains:
(1) The decedent’s surviving spouse.
(2) The decedent’s surviving adult child or children. However, if the
children cannot agree on the manner of final disposition, the personal
representative of the decedent’s estate.
(3) The decedent’s surviving parents.
(4) The personal representative of the decedent’s estate.
Id.
164
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remains of their daughter.172 The court gave half of the girl’s ashes to the
mother and half to the father.173
Similarly, an Illinois court ordered the division of the ashes of a
twelve-year-old boy between his parents because the parents could not
agree on a form of interment for the child.174 The mother wanted to bury
the child, and the father wanted to have the child cremated.175 Although
the father had full custody, the court did not allow him to have full
custody of the child’s body.176 After the court made its decision, the
mother backed down because she did not want the child’s ashes to be
split in half.177 Therefore, the father was able to bury the child.178
Although the courts allocate decision-making power when they
order a custody decree, disputes still arise between the parents.179 In
addition, while life-support and burial statutes authorize parents to
make decisions regarding life-support and burial for their children,
parents disagree over the degree of input each parent should have in the
decision.180 However, allowing both parents, whether custodial or noncustodial, to contribute to end-of-life decisions will change the focus of
end-of-life decision-making for children of divorced parents from the
best interests of the child to the best interests of the parent.

Id. The mother argued that the court should have followed the decision in Tully. Id.
Most state statutes, except the burial statute in Missouri, list “parents” as the group in the
hierarchy of who is entitled to make either life-support or burial decisions for the dying or
deceased. See supra notes 127–28, 142 and accompanying text.
173
Id. The court also stated that the daughter was agreeable to having her ashes
separated because she wanted them spread in three different places. Id. It also looked to
industry standards and found that dividing cremated remains between loved ones is
common. Id.
174
Judgment of Solomon in Burial Dispute, PRESS ASSOC., June 16, 1994, available at LEXIS,
News & Business, PANews File.
175
Id. The father claimed that his twelve-year-old son had once stated that he wanted to
be cremated. Id.
176
Id. The court ordered the boy’s body to be cremated and the ashes to be divided
between the parents. Id.
177
Id. The representative of the mother stated that the boy’s ashes should not be split
because “[a] kid ain’t no piece of cake.” Id.
178
Id.
179
See supra Part II.A.
180
See supra Part II.B.
172
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III. ANALYSIS
As technology increases, disputes over burial and life-sustaining
treatment will become more common for divorced parents.181 However,
the goals of the traditional custody decision-making factors should no
longer be applicable when determining which parent would be best to
make end-of-life decisions for his or her children.182 Instead, the focus
should shift from the best interests of the child to the best interests of the
parent.183 In addition, courts and statutes have failed to set a discernable
standard for determining how much input each parent will have in
burial and life-support decisions.184 If increasing each parent’s decisionmaking authority should lead to a dispute, two possible methods to
resolve the dispute exist: parenting plans and mediation.185 Through the
creation of a parenting plan, parents could stipulate how they would
want life-support and burial decision-making authority allocated.186 In
addition, mediation, which is increasingly used to resolve other types of
custody disputes, life-support disputes, and burial disputes, would also
be an effective method to resolve life-support and burial disagreements
between the parents of divorced children.187
Part III.A analyzes how the traditional factors courts use to
determine decision-making authority are no longer applicable when the
child is dying or deceased.188 Next, Part III.B argues that allowing both
parents to participate in life-support and burial decisions is in the best
interests of the parents.189 Finally, Part III.C analyzes life-support and
burial statutes as well as case law in order to illustrate that state
legislatures and courts have failed to form a clear and convincing
standard for allocating end-of-life decision-making power between
divorced parents.190

See supra notes 109, 125 and accompanying text (discussing the recent advances in lifesupport and burial technology).
182
See infra Part III.A.
183
See infra Part III.B.
184
See infra Part III.C.
185
See infra Part III.D.
186
See infra Part III.D.1.
187
See infra Part III.D.2.
188
See infra Part III.A.
189
See infra Part III.B.
190
See infra Part III.C.
181
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A. Traditional Decision-Making Allocation Factors Are Not Applicable When
Making End-of-Life Decisions
Currently, end-of-life decision-making power is essentially allocated
between parents when the courts issue the original custody decree,
ordering either joint custody, allowing both parents to make end-of-life
decisions, or sole custody, naming only one parent as the decisionmaker.191 When deciding which type of custody to award, the state
statutes and courts focus on the best interests of the child, which include
factors such as the economic capability of the parents, the amount of
time the parents can spend with the child, and the distance between the
parents’ residences.192 Although these factors would impact the child
while the child is alive and conscious and thus should be considered
when deciding whether to award joint custody, these factors should not
bear on the ability of both parents to make end-of-life decisions for their
children.193 Therefore, the best interests factors are generally irrelevant if
the child is on life-support or deceased.194
For example, one of the most important and common criteria courts
require before agreeing to award joint custody, thus giving the parents
equal decision-making power, is the need for continuity and stability in
the child’s life.195 Although it may be important for a child to live in the
same surroundings, with the same friends, and answer to the same
parental authority figure while the child is conscious and alive, this
concern would not be pertinent in determining who should make endof-life decisions.196 Because the child is unconscious, he would have no
awareness of the stability of his environment and could not be hurt by
the absence of continuity. There would be no need to worry about the
child being a “shuttle-cock,” which occurs when the child is physically
and emotionally pushed and pulled between his parents.197 In addition,
191
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the different types of custody—sole and joint—and
the decision-making authority each type bestows upon each parent at dissolution).
192
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing other factors, such as
communication, that the court takes into account under the best interests test).
193
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing the best interests factors).
194
See supra note 47 (discussing factors such as the child’s preference, the child’s
adjustment to the child’s school, and the child’s interaction with her parents and siblings,
which would not be relevant because the child is unconscious or deceased and therefore
cannot have a parental preference, cannot attend school, and cannot interact with her
parents).
195
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing continuity as a best interests
factor).
196
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
197
Brauer v. Brauer, 384 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). While “regularity in the
daily routine of providing the child with food, sleep, and general care” may be important
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because parental love and dedication is not necessarily a factor
considered by the courts under the best interests test, this determination
may bar a loving parent from one of the most important and final
decisions concerning the child.198
However, there are some factors that courts take into account in
order to determine whether parents are capable of managing a joint
custody agreement that still need addressing if both parents are allotted
equal rights in making life-support and burial decisions for their
children. Both parents would still need the ability to communicate with
each other in order to make a final decision for their child.199 However,
even if parents argued in the past and continuously litigated the right to
make decisions for their children, courts still allowed them to retain joint
custody and thus joint decision-making power.200 Because some courts
allow parents to retain their inherent decision-making rights equally
after divorce despite the potential of future disagreements between
them, courts should also allow both parents to make burial and lifesupport decisions.201
B. Allowing Both of the Parents To Be Involved in Making End-of Life
Decisions Is in the Best Interests of the Parent
While the ability to cooperate and communicate would still be the
paramount concern in allowing both parents to make end-of-life
decisions for the child, these decisions carry with them more finality
than other decisions concerning the child.202 In all other decision-making
situations, the parents may later petition the court to modify a prior
custody decree in order to gain more authority over their child.203
However, if the child is dead or sustained only by life support, the
parent may not have as much time or would not want to prolong his

enough to deny both parents equal decision-making rights while the child is alive, those
reasons would no longer be applicable if the child is unconscious or dead. See supra note 28
and accompanying text.
198
See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (discussing the best interests test courts
use when creating a custody arrangement).
199
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing communication as one of the
most common and most important factors when the court decides to award joint custody
and thus joint decision-making power).
200
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
201
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
202
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (stating that the state
has an important interest in regulating ending life because of the “overwhelming finality”
of those decisions).
203
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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grief by returning to court.204 In addition, if the parent attempts to alter
the custody decree, the court may enact a ruling that does not conform
to the wishes of either parent, leaving both parents unhappy.205
While the best interests factors may no longer be applicable because
benefits to the child are impossible, allowing both parents to participate
in the end-of-life decision-making process could benefit the parents.206
Courts have increasingly found that parents want to be more involved in
making decisions for their children, which illustrates that those decisions
benefit the parents as well.207 This is especially important because
involvement in burial and life-support decisions can help the divorced
parents cope with the loss of their child.208
One weakness of allowing both parents to become involved in endof-life decision-making is the risk of allowing a parent who has not been
involved in the child’s life to come back and usurp the power to make
decisions for the child from the parent who has been involved in the
child’s life. The parent may try to re-enter the child’s life for vindictive
reasons or because he feels he should have been involved in the child’s
life before death.209 However, courts have already addressed this
problem within life-sustaining treatment decision-making cases.210
Courts could evaluate the extent to which the parents were involved in
the child’s life before the child was put on life-support or passed away.211
204
See HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 85, at 103 (stating that parties to a dispute
over life-sustaining treatment decisions should first conclude that the dispute is
irresolvable before seeking judicial involvement); see also notes 118, 121, 130–31 and
accompanying text (discussing loved ones’ grief and emotional issues when they are
required to make life-support and burial decisions).
205
See, e.g., Day, supra note 54, at 536 (“As for the problem of choosing between bickering
parents, the court is likely to award legal custody to the parent who appears to be more
cooperative, converting the less cooperative parent’s legal custodial rights into a privilege
of liberal visitation.”); Infant, supra note 92 (describing a judge’s ruling not to allow either
parent to make the decision to remove the child from life-support).
206
See supra Part III.A (analyzing why the best interests standard is no longer relevant
when the child is dying or deceased).
207
See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
208
See supra notes 118, 121, 130–31 and accompanying text.
209
See Robert H. Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, Facing the Dilemmas of Child Custody, 10
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 54, 54 (2002) (arguing that parents usually “are strongly attached to
the children, strongly committed to their welfare, and have a clear record of having been
responsible, fit parents before the separation”); see also HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra
note 85, at 86 (stating that although family members may become involved in life-support
decisions for selfish reasons, hospital ethics committees should still meet with them to try
to get them to overcome their “selfish interests”).
210
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
211
See supra text accompanying note 98.
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Therefore, by considering how the divorced parents have participated in
past decisions, courts could preclude the parent who had never been
involved with the child from usurping power from the parent who had
been the sole parent to the child.212
Another alleged weakness in allowing both parents to make end-oflife decisions is that the non-custodial parent may go against the
custodial parent’s decision to be vindictive.213 However, there is an
equal risk that the custodial parent may also act only for vindictive
reasons in order to deny the non-custodial parent authority to make
burial and life-support decisions.214 An otherwise loving parent could be
excluded from his child’s funeral or from determining whether to sustain
his child’s life-support because the custodial parent had a selfish
agenda.215
C. The Courts and Statutes Have Failed To Address End-of-Life DecisionMaking Disputes in a Clear and Convincing Manner
Courts have seemingly begun to recognize that the factors it takes
into consideration when it makes an end-of-life decision differ from
those factors it routinely take into consideration when making the
original custody decree.216 In burial dispute cases, the courts have
broken from the general tenet that the parent with sole custody has the
ultimate authority to make all of the major life decisions for his child.217
By either allowing both parents to have rights to possess the body of
their deceased child or allowing the non-custodial parent to have a say in
the decision-making process, courts have broken from the traditional
standard that the parent with legal custody has the sole power to make
all decisions for the child.218

See supra text accompanying note 98.
See Rader v. Davis, 134 N.W. 849 (Iowa 1912). In Rader, although the court found that
there was not any evidence that the father-in-law acted vindictively in keeping the child’s
father from attending the funeral, if he had acted with vindictiveness, there still would be
no cause of action. Id. at 851.
214
See, Tully v. Pate, 372 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (D.S.C. 1973) (“The court has suspicioned
the forum is being used for vindictive pursuit rather than a place where justice is sought.”).
215
See supra text accompanying note 151.
216
See, e.g., In re Admin. of K.A., 807 N.E.2d 748, 750–51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (relying on
the state’s burial statute in order to avoid giving the parent with legal custody sole
authority over her deceased daughter’s remains).
217
See supra notes 144–78 and accompanying text (discussing the burial dispute cases and
how the court allocated decision-making power in each case).
218
See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (discussing legal custody arrangements
and the authority the parent receives from such a custody arrangement); see also Vujovic,
212
213
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However, court decisions have left parents with no discernable or
settled standard.219 Comparing the decision in Tully with the decision in
In re Administration of K.A., the courts applied two different standards.220
In one case, the court applied general custody law, but in the other case,
the court applied the state statute pertaining to burial rights without
regard to the underlying custody issue.221 Further, most state lifesupport and burial statutes do not specify which parent has the right to
bury a child or to end a child’s life support.222 Instead, these statutes
provide only that “parents” have the right to make decisions for a
patient.223 If parents look to these cases or to state statutes, which do not
specify which parent has the right to make burial or life-support
decisions for the child, they have no definitive method to determine
what rights they would have in regards to each other.
A statute that has addressed end-of-life decision-making and
divorced parents bases the burial decision on traditional custody
decision-making allocation: The sole custodial parent makes the
decision.224 But, according to the statute, if the child is the subject of a
joint custody arrangement, the child’s interment decisions are made by
the person who lives at the child’s mailing address.225 This method is not
logical because there may be many reasons why a child would have a
particular mailing address. The child’s address does not necessarily
demonstrate how much a parent is involved with the child and that the
parent would be in the best position to make decisions for the child. An
otherwise loving parent could be barred from his child’s funeral even if
the parents have joint custody.226 A different standard needs to exist in
supra note 32, at 477 (“Child custody and visitation laws have evolved over time to
correspond to changing societal attitudes toward marriage, family and gender.”).
219
Compare Tully, 372 F. Supp. 1064 (using state custody law to determine the respective
rights of the parents in making burial decisions), with In re Admin. of K.A., 807 N.E.2d 748
(using the burial statute and not the custody statute to determine decision-making
allocation between the parents over their deceased child).
220
See supra notes 150–73 and accompanying text (discussing Tully and In re Admin. of
K.A.).
221
See supra notes 152, 170 and accompanying text.
222
See supra notes 85, 127 and accompanying text (discussing the life-support and burial
statutes and how the statutes state only “parents” as a class of decision-makers).
223
See supra notes 85, 127 and accmpanying text. This Note only considers the
implications of the life-support and burial statutes on a minor and the minor’s parents.
However, it is important to note that so long as the statutes list “parents” as a general class
of decision-makers, it can lead to confusion even for the parents of adult children.
224
See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 194.119(2)(3)(a)–(c) (West 2004).
225
See id.
226
See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text (discussing the rights of the noncustodial parent to participate in burial decisions).
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order for parents to plan according to the rights they have in making
end-of-life decisions for their children.227
D. Possible Alternative Methods To Allow Both Parents To Make End-of-Life
Decisions
If a dispute should arise or the parents would like to allocate
decision-making authority on the chance that a dispute will arise, there
are two potential methods that parents could use to aid them in making
end-of-life decisions for their children: parenting plans and mediation.228
1.

Parenting Plans

First, parents could determine what method they would use to
resolve an end-of-life decision-making dispute or could stipulate which
parent should make the final decision in such circumstances in a
parenting plan.229 Just as there is a current trend in allowing parents to
utilize mediation, there is also a current trend towards allowing parents
to allocate decision-making power in parenting plans.230 By creating a
parenting plan, each parent would have input in the final custody
decree, and the parents could address how they would want the
decision-making responsibility allocated if their child needs lifesustaining treatment or dies.231 While broaching the topic during the
original custody determination could potentially create a problem that
may never need to be addressed, it could save time and money by
avoiding the issue in the future.232

227
See Tarantino, supra note 81, at 647 (stating that the federal government should step in
and provide a uniform method for deciding who should make life-support decisions
because there are large differences in these statues that may encourage forum shopping).
228
See Linda Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody
Arrangements, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 615, 657 (2004) (proposing that parents, not courts, should
make custody and therefore decision-making authority decisions).
229
See Crosby, supra note 4, at 510 (stating that parents must discuss how decisions will
be allocated when they create a parenting plan).
230
See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in parental
participation in creating custody decrees and thus in allocating decision-making power).
231
See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing parenting plans).
232
See supra notes 55, 118, 134 (stating that litigating custody, life-support, and burial
disputes can be expensive and time-consuming).
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Mediation

Second, parents could use mediation to resolve disputes over
whether to remove a child from life-support or how to inter their child.233
Mediation has been proposed for burial and life-support termination
disputes in general, despite the fact that statutes and case law have long
determined which people have the superior right to make those
decisions.234
However, these general proposals have failed to take into
consideration any of the custody issues traditionally involved when
there is a decision-making dispute between the parents of divorced
children.235 Nonetheless, alternative dispute resolution has proven
successful in handling other types of disputes between parents that have
conventionally been handled by courts applying traditional custody
law.236 Allowing parents to use mediation if a dispute arises at the end
of their child’s life would follow the trend of increasing the use of
mediation in child custody cases.237 It is also less expensive and less
time-consuming, which permits parents to resolve the life-support and
burial decision-making disputes more rapidly than if they had resorted
to litigation.238
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Current state statutes that describe the hierarchy of decision-makers
for burial and life-support decisions list only “parents” in general as a
class of persons able to make life-support and interment decisions.239
However, the statutes fail to address the situation of divorced parents.240
See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of mediation in
resolving traditional custody disputes, and thus asserting that mediation could also be
applied to life-support and burial disputes).
234
See generally Cohen, supra note 117 (proposing mediation as an alternative to litigation
in order to resolve life-support disputes); Josias, supra note 125 (proposing alternative
dispute resolution as an alternative to litigation in resolving burial disputes).
235
See generally Josias, supra note 125. Although Josias mentions the Tully case and
suggests that alternative dispute resolution could be used in disputes between parents, he
fails to address the underlying custody issue: complete decision-making power in the
hands of the custodial parent. Id. Cohen also fails to address the complication of lifesupport decision-making for divorced parents who would also be subject to custody laws.
See Cohen, supra note 117.
236
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
237
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
238
See BERGER, supra note 86, at 77 (stating that courts should be the last resort in end-oflife decisions).
239
See supra notes 85, 127 (listing examples of life-support and burial statutes).
240
See supra Part III.C.
233
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This Note proposes model life support and burial right statutes that
distinguish between parents that are still married and parents that are
divorced. The statutes create a right for both parents, custodial and noncustodial, to participate in end-of-life decisions for their children. In
addition, the model statutes successfully address the inadequacy of
current statutes, which only allow the custodial parent to make the endof-life decisions for the child and fail to distinguish between parents who
are married and parents who are divorced:
Life-Support Statute241
For any minor or other incompetent patient, any of the following
persons, in order of priority stated, when persons in prior classes are not
available or willing to serve, may serve as a surrogate for the incompetent
adult or minor:
(1) A legal guardian of the patient, if one has been
appointed;
(2) In the case of an unmarried patient under the age of
eighteen, the parents of the patient.
Both parents have the ability to authorize together the
withdrawal or withholding of artificially-provided nutrition
and hydration of their minor child, if they so choose to be
involved, regardless of the custodial arrangement, unless the
custody decree or parenting plan specifically states which
parent has the authority to withdraw or withhold artificiallyprovided nutrition and hydration.
If the parents cannot agree on whether to sustain or
withdraw artificially-provided nutrition and hydration, then
they shall submit to mediation. If after a reasonable effort has
been made at mediation by both parents to resolve the dispute
the parents cannot reach an agreement, then the court shall
determine which parent shall make the decision;
(3) The patient’s spouse;
(4) The patient’s adult child or, if there is more than
one, then a majority of the patient’s adult children
participating in the decision;
This model statute is based on ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11 (2004) and ARK. CODE ANN. § 2017-214 (Michie 2004). The italicized text is the author’s contribution.

241
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(5) The parents of a patient over the age of eighteen;
(6) The patient’s adult sibling or, if there is more
than one, then a majority of the patient’s adult siblings
participating in the decision;
(7) Persons standing in loco parentis to the patient;
or
(8) A majority of the patient’s adult heirs at law
who participate in the decision.
Interment Statute242
The following persons, in the order of priority
indicated, have the authority to designate the manner,
type, and selection of the final disposition and interment
of human remains:
(1) The decedent’s surviving spouse.
(2) The decedent’s surviving adult child or children.
However, if the children cannot agree on the manner of
final disposition, the personal representative of the
decedent’s estate.
(3) The decedent’s surviving parents if the decedent
is not a minor.
(4) If the decedent is a minor:
Both of the decedent’s parents, if they so choose to be
involved, regardless of the custodial arrangement, unless the
custody decree or parenting plan specifically states which
parent has the authority to designate the manner, type, and
selection of the final disposition and interment of human
remains.
If the parents cannot agree on the manner, type, or
selection of the final disposition and interment of the
decedent’s remains, then they shall submit to mediation. If
after a reasonable effort has been made at mediation by both
242
This model statute is based on an Indiana statute. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18 (West
2001). The italicized text is the author’s contribution.
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parents to resolve the dispute the parents cannot reach an
agreement, then the court shall determine which parent shall
make the decision.
(5) The personal representative of the decedent’s estate.
Commentary
The model statutes create a right for the parent who does not have
formal decision-making power over the child to have some input into
what may be the most difficult decisions of his life. First, the statutes
only require that the parents work together to make the burial and life
support decisions if they both desire to participate in the decisions. They
do not require the custodial parent to alert the non-custodial parent
before action can be taken. By not requiring both parents to be present to
make a decision, the statutes avoid the potential problem of having to
find a non-existent parent who has had no recent contact with the child.
Therefore, a parent who has not seen his child for a long period of time,
so long as he does not have knowledge that his child is dying or
deceased, will not need to be contacted before the parent that has
participated in the child’s life can render a decision.
In addition, the statutes only require that parents work together if
the parent actively tries to become involved in the process. The noncustodial parent does not need to be consulted on all decisions, but if
that parent does have an opinion and makes it known, then the parents
would need to come to some kind of consensus. By not requiring the
non-custodial parent to participate, the statutes avoid the problem of
trying to force a parent to participate who otherwise would not be
involved in the decision-making process, thereby creating the
unnecessary potential for disagreement.
Also, according to the model statutes, both parents will receive the
benefits of participating in the decision-making process regardless of the
original custody decree. Parents will gain from participating in burial
and life-support decisions because involvement in those types of
decisions helps the participant in the grieving process. Because the
statutes provide a means for parents to grieve, they shift the focus onto
the best interests of the parents.
Finally, the statutes foresee that there may be some disagreements
between the parents over how the child should be interred or whether
the child should be removed from life support. The statutes exempt
parents from sharing burial and life-support decision-making power if
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the parents have already allocated the life-support or burial decisionmaking power in a parenting plan or in the custody decree. In
recognizing parenting plans, the statutes give the parents the
opportunity to formulate their own decision-making arrangement. In
addition, the statutes require immediate mediation between the parents
in order to come to a solution if they should disagree. Through
mediation, the parents will be able to resolve disputes more quickly, less
expensively, and on their own terms.
V. CONCLUSION
End-of-life decision-making for the children of divorced parents is
an area of the law that has been inconsistent and unclear. While
traditionally the legal custodial parent holds the right to make major
decisions for their children, end-of-life decisions, such as termination of
life-sustaining treatment and the method of interment, should include
both parents if they desire to be involved. By clarifying the respective
rights of the parents and allowing both to be involved in the end-of-life
decisions, parents will be aware of their rights if their child dies.
Although opening up end-of-life decisions to both parents may create
some disagreement, parenting plans and mediation can help resolve any
disputes. For example, as applied to the hypothetical proposed at the
beginning of this Note, the model burial and life-support statutes would
have granted Charlie and Amy equal decision-making authority over
Clifford. Although they may still have disagreed, mediation would have
allowed the two parents to make a decision together, which stands in
contrast to the current all-or-nothing approach. Amy would not have
been pressured to take Clifford off life-support, and Charlie would have
had the right to attend Clifford’s funeral.
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